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Title: Oriental Ghosts: The Haunting Memory of Millán-Astray’s Bushido and Julian Besteiro’s Kokoro

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Abstract: This article analyzes Millán-Astray’s translation of Inazo Nitobe’s Bushido, and Julián Besteiro’s translation of Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life as paradigmatic examples of conservative and liberal Japonismo to explore the ambivalent relation of liberals and conservatives with evolving notions of democratic government. I argue that, rather than two clearly differentiated forms of Spanish Japonismo (one conservative/imperialist and the other liberal/regeneracionista), Japonismo was symptomatic of a deeper unease with the repeated attempts to articulate a Spanish liberal state that informed the actions of both liberals and conservatives.

Keywords: Japonismo, Orientalism, Regeneracionismo, Liberal Democracy, Volkgeist, Demos, Proletariat, Bushido, Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life, Inazo Nitobe, José Millán-Astray, Julián Besteiro, Lafcadio Hearn

Resumen: Este artículo analiza la traducción de la obra de Inazo Nitobe Bushido llevada a cabo por José Millán Astray así como la traducción de la obra de Lafcadio Hearn Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life como ejemplos paradigmáticos de japónismo liberal y conservador. El objetivo del artículo es estudiar la ambivalente relación de liberales y conservadores con la noción del espíritu del pueblo en sus tres articulaciones: volkgeist, demos y proletariado. Considero que, más que dos formas claramente diferenciadas de japónismo (conservador/imperialista frente a liberal/regeneracionista), el japónismo era un discurso sintomático del profundo malestar liberal y conservador con los distintos intentos de articular un estado liberal español.


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Orientalist Ghosts: The Haunting Memory of Millán-Astray’s *Bushido* and Julián Besteiro’s *Kokoro*.

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In 1941, only two years after the end of the Spanish Civil War, José Millán-Astray, at that time no longer the director of the Francoist propaganda services, and exiled in Lisbon on account of his scandalous relationship with Rita Gasset, niece of the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, published a translation of Inazo Nitobe’s 1899 *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*. The publication of the translation coincided with a turn in Spanish-Japanese relations as the Francoist regime tried to distance itself from the Nippon empire. The founder of the Spanish Foreign Legion had increasingly become a liability for the nascent Francoist regime, and his belated Japonist fascination with Nitobe’s *Bushido* would be one more indication that the man that the Francoists had vindicated as a hero was quickly becoming a reminder of everything they wanted to forget. Although most critics (Rodriguez-Navarro, Rodao, Preston) agree that Millán-Astray’s purpose in publishing this translation was merely to associate the image of the Spanish Foreign Legion with that of the successful Japanese empire that Nitobe’s *Bushido* came to represent, I contend that a re-contextualization of Millán-Astray’s translation is needed in order to understand the evolving political significance that Spain’s fascination with Japan had between the late 1800s and the first half of the XXth century. In attempting to historicize Millán-Astray’s *Japonismo*, this article compares the ideological context of his translation of *Bushido* with that of Julián Besteiro’s translation of Lafcadio Hearn’s *Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life*. *Bushido*, an account of the Samurai moral system written in English for an American audience, and *Kokoro*, a series of articles on Japanese culture also written in English for a Western audience, are key texts in the orientalist tradition that informed Western images of Japan during at the turn of the Twentieth century. The translations of these two texts into Spanish provide valuable insight into how this cosmopolitan Japonism was received in Spain. I argue that, rather than two clearly differentiated forms of Spanish *Japonismo* (one conservative/imperialist and the other liberal/regeneracionista), what we find is a much foggier, orientalist discourse that ends up subverting the supposedly liberal spirit of the *Japonismo* articulated by the *regeneracionistas*. I will begin my analysis with Millán-Astray’s 1941 translation of Inazo Nitobe’s *Bushido* and then work my way in reverse chronological order to the turn of the century liberal *Japonismo* of which Julián Besteiro was a crucial representative.

The ambivalent rhetoric of *Japonismo* was informed by the equally ambivalent relation of modernismo with modernity. Calinescu argues that the positivist paradigm on which modernity was predicated led to the dissociation of social and aesthetic modernity during the Nineteenth century (41). As Cathy Login Jrade explains, the aestheticism that characterizes modernismo has traditionally been interpreted as a frivolous form of escapism from political engagement, but “readers and critics alike tended to overlook modernismo’s confrontation with modernity
and the political and epistemological response that it provoked” (138). Japonism was one of the many ways in which artists expressed their resistance to what they perceived as a dehumanized and dehumanizing form of modernity and promoted a return to a “visión estética de la vida” as Jose Ramón Mérida, a regeneracionista historian and archeologist, explained in 1890 (quoted in Litvak 113).

The modernist aestheticism that japonismo represents, accordingly, was initially intended to reveal hidden truths about society’s problems rather than hide them. Resistance to modernity, however, could be motivated by different political agendas; for social conservatives like Millán-Astray, modernity threatened the traditional social order. For those on the moderate left like Besteiro, modernity had brought about inhumane working conditions for millions of workers and should be redirected to create a better society. The critique of modernity implicit in japonismo clearly appealed to both of them. Millán-Astray’s and Besteiro’s orientalism pursued different goals, but the philosophical context in which both forms of japonismo appeared did not demarcate as clear a division between both of them as we now may be inclined to think. Herbert Spencer’s concepts of Evolutionary Ethics, what came to be known as Social Darwinism, was a major influence in the work of Nitobe and a clear referent for Hearn. Spencer argued that social progress follows the same law as biological evolution: the survival of the fittest is the natural selection process by which societies constantly improve themselves. Despite the fact that Spencer did not approve of colonialism, which he considered an unwarranted intromission of a state in the natural evolution of other states, it is easy to see how the notion of social darwinism could attract those like Millán-Astray that considered imperial expansion as the logical result of the survival of the fittest nations. Spencer’s belief that “under the natural order of things, society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members” aimed to describe the organic evolution of society within its national borders, but the same disdain for societies weakest members could easily be translated into a justification of the colonization of weak nations by stronger ones (323). Spencer’s Social Darwinism, however, was not a modern rearticulation of Hobbes political philosophy, but rather its opposite. If Hobbes believed that men accepted the social contract to escape from the gruesome competition among individuals, Spencer believed that competition for survival was precisely what helped to improve society. Progress, according to Spencer, promoted not only the survival of those that were biologically fittest, but also ethically fittest: a more evolved man should also be morally superior. It was this aspect of Spencer’s Evolutionary Ethics that attracted many on the left. As Robert Richards explains, turn of the century marxists like Enrico Ferri, Eduard Bernstein, August Bebel, and Rudolf Virchow believed that biological evolution had socialism as a natural consequence (267).

I will begin my analysis of the ideological context that informed each of their idiosyncratic forms of japonismo by describing the general purpose of Inazo Nitobe’s Bushido and the significance of Millán-Astray’s translation in the early years of the Francoist regime. Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought was Inazo Nitobe’s attempt to introduce Japanese culture to a Western audience. The book was first published in English in the United States in 1899. Nitobe took great care to present his own understanding of Bushido (literally, the way of the Samurai) as an Oriental version of Western Chivalry, and to adapt most cultural concepts associated with it to a Western sensitivity. His account of the Samurai code of honor included a quite extensive discussion of the moral values, institutions, and relevance of Bushido in contemporary Japan.

Nitobe’s description of the Samurai belief system was wildly popular with liberal and conservative audiences alike throughout the United States, and Europe. In Spain, the example of modern Japan was often pointed out as living proof that old empires could successfully adapt to the new times and regain
their position in the international community. Millán-Astray indicated in the prologue to his translation that the Bushido had been his main source of inspiration for the design of the Spanish Foreign Legion, a military force deeply connected to Spain’s efforts to preserve its imperial status by pursuing the colonization of North Africa (9). Japan and the Bushido, according to Millán-Astray’s words, could function as a reminder of Spain’s imperial essence. It is certainly tempting to take Millán-Astray’s ahistorical narrative as an example of an orientalist appropriation of Nitobe’s work in the benefit of the Francoist cause; I would argue, however, that appropriation may not be the best term to describe Millán-Astray’s fascination with Nitobe’s work. Like any other orientalist text, Bushido describes Japan from a Eurocentric perspective, but the Eurocentrism that can be detected in Bushido is not one that Millán-Astray imposed on the text, but one that was already present in Nitobe’s work.

Nitobe’s Bushido was, first of all, part of a large propaganda campaign to find supporters for the Japanese empire in the West. His portrayal of the Samurai code of honor, and his own public persona as a Japanese citizen that had converted to Quakerism and married an American invited ideological appropriation rather than demand orthodox exegesis of the Japanese canon. Furthermore, throughout Bushido, Nitobe emphasized the similarities between the Japanese moral code and Western tradition as this passage from Nitobe’s work indicates: “It is indeed striking how closely the code of knightly honor of one country coincides with that of others; in other words, how the much abused oriental ideas of morals find their counterparts in the noblest maxims of European literature” (23).

As Rodriguez-Navarro indicates, both Nitobe’s original English version of Bushido and Millán-Astray’s translation must be understood within the context of the Eurocentric, orientalist tradition (119). Nitobe adapted the Samurai code to the sensibility of the West, and Millán-Astray made sure to censor or alter those elements in Bushido that would contradict Francoist dogmas. Millán-Astray’s translation, as could be expected, was not an objective transliteration of the original English text into Spanish, but a carefully edited version of the original text. Among the many examples of Millán-Astray’s adaptation /misinterpretation of the original are his treatment of concepts such as Seppuku and what Nitobe describes as Samurai disdain for bookish learning. The Japanese concept of death with honor, Seppuku, on which Millán-Astray claimed to have based the Spanish Legionnaire’s mysticism of death in combat, is certainly taken out of context. Nitobe reminds us throughout Bushido that “[c]ourage was scarcely deemed worthy to be counted among virtues, unless it was exercised in the cause of Righteousness” (29). Hence, the legionnaire’s “espiritu de acudir al fuego” that encouraged soldiers to always seek death in combat could hardly be equated to Seppuku. Similarly, Nitobe’s comment that “[a] typical samurai calls a literary savant a book-smelling sot” must have resonated with both Millán-Astray and the Falangists since both of them praised irrationalism as summarized by Millán-Astray’s infamous words to Unamuno: “Muera la inteligencia” (Bushido 17). Nitobe, however, was not arguing against intellectual labor, but arguing that the Samurai must not only study Confucian classics, but show proof of the assimilation of this intellectual knowledge in his character. Rodriguez-Navarro mentions other significant changes in Millán-Astray’s translation such as the deletion of any historical references to Spanish military defeats, marxism, or masonic practices, as well as the depiction of Bushido as a primitive form of Christianity (229).

Important as these changes are in the general message of Bushido, to present Millán-Astray’s translation as a blatant disfiguration of the original would be exaggerated. The fact that the first edition of Millán-Astray’s translation was financed by the Japanese government, as Rodao mentions, suggests that rather than an appropriation of Nitobe’s
work, Millán-Astray’s translation was a suitable vehicle to disseminate a positive image of the Japanese empire (123). On the other hand, Millán-Astray hoped to regain his popularity with the regime by associating himself and the Spanish Legion with the, up to that moment, highly popular image of an idealized, chivalric Japan.

Rather than elaborating any further on the fidelity of Millán-Astray’s translation to Nitobe’s orientalist original, I will concentrate on describing the cultural context that made Bushido popular among liberal and conservative Spanish readers alike before discussing the ways in which Besteiro’s Japonismo and his interest in Lafcadio Hearn’s Kokoro differed from that of Millán-Astray.

In the case of the turn of the turn of the century Japonismo that informs Millán-Astray’s Bushido, the fascination with Japan was not only an exponent of the orientalist allure of a remote and exotic land, but a highly idiosyncratic calculation of Spain’s chances to preserve its empire in Southeast Asia. As Rodao explains, Japan was perceived by Spain as both an example to emulate and a very real threat to its possessions in that region. The rapid expansion of Japan after the Sino-Japanese war had made the Spanish colonial government in Manila fear a possible alliance between the Filipinos and the Japanese that could have resulted in the take over of the colony (Rodao 57). The Japanese attack to the Spanish colony, however, never materialized, and Spain ended up losing the Philippines to the United States. Despite the loss of sovereignty over the archipelago, the commercial interests of the Spanish community in the Philippines were not greatly affected by the American occupation. Spain was in no position to engage once more in war with the United States to try to recover its ex-colony, and it opted for waiting patiently for the return of the Philippines to independence, which had been set for 1945. The Spanish government believed that once the United States left the archipelago, the strong economic and cultural presence of Spain in its ex-colony would suffice to reinstate its de facto control over it. The assumption that the Philippines would gladly return to Spanish rule, or consent on any form of Spanish control of its affairs may sound counterintuitive, particularly if we consider that when Japan did eventually invade the Philippines in 1941, Spain, rather than abandoning hope of recovering its old colony, temporarily entertained the idea that not only the Filipino people but also the Japanese would welcome Spanish rule on the archipelago. The rationale for the seemingly delusional expectations that characterized Spanish post-imperial, colonialist discourse can partly be found in Spain’s tacit collaboration with Japan and the other members of the Axis at the beginning of World War II. Spain was expecting a payback from Japan in exchange for its continued support. Such expectations, however, were, to a certain extent, naive since neither the Philippines nor Japan had expressed any desire to act against their own interests; but they seemed attainable within the idiosyncratic logic of Spanish colonialist rhetoric.

Unlike the colonialist discourse developed by other European powers from the XVIIIth century on, Spain did not articulate its colonialist ideology around notions of racial, cultural or strictly military superiority but around the notion of cultural and emotional proximity with the colonized. Gustau Nerín, following the Portuguese colonial model, has called this notion of colonial fraternity Hispanotropicalism: the idea that the allegiance of the colonized to the metropolis is a sentimental bond, a notion that as Martin-Márquez tells us became articulated well before the advent of the Francoist regime, during the Nineteenth century (Guinea 11; Disorientations 73). In the mind of the Spanish colonizer, the colonized Filipino people could not help but to return to a fraternal relation with the Spanish metropolis once the yoke of unfraternal colonization by the United States had been lifted. Interestingly, Spanish colonialist discourse did not measure the allegiance of its colonies in terms of the geopolitical factors that allowed for the subjugation of the colony, but in terms of the strength
of its sentimental attachment to the colonizer. In his unpublished memoirs, Millán-Astray compares the deeply felt _Hispanidad_ of the Filipino people with the subversive detachment of the Moroccans:

[The Filipino people's] nobleza tuvo muchas ocasiones de comprobarse en la conducta generosa que siguieron con los prisioneros españoles, respetando sus vidas, y algunos fueron tan humanitariamente tratados que al recobrar la libertad demostraron su gratitud casándose con las hijas de sus guardianes. 

Comparada esta conducta de los filipinos con la vengativa de los moros, que más tarde habríamos de conocer, resalta, en los filipinos, la generosidad con el enemigo; en los moros, el más horrible encarnizamiento; en los tagalos, la falta absoluta de las artes de la guerra; en los africanos, la más perfecta maestría. Los filipinos serán siempre españoles en sus corazones; los moros africanos no lo serán jamás. (quoted in Togores 57-58)

It is important to remember that both the Hispanotropicalist discourse and the notion of Hispanidad that it entails do not come into being until the Spanish empire has pretty much disappeared. The early articulation of the term by Miguel de Unamuno (1927) and its re-articulation by Ramiro de Maeztu (1938) are a nostalgic attempt to compensate for the absence of an empire by invoking a hypothetical community of sentiment while disguising, if not hiding altogether, Spain’s prolonged decadence. Not surprisingly, Ernesto Giménez-Caballero’s essay _Rizal_, portrays the loss of the Filipinos to the United States not as a result of the deterioration of the Spanish military power, or the bankruptcy of the Spanish state, but as the result of Spain’s failure to abide by the (Hispanotropicalist) spirit of Philip II’s mandate which Giménez Caballero describes as follows:

Nada de conquista ni de violencia. 
Sólo paz y caridad. Tratarles como hermanos. Ofrecerles cuanto teníamos: la plata de las Indias y la renta de España misma si fuera preciso. A eso no ha llegado, ni llegarán, Estados Unidos, a pesar de su generoso intención hacia Rizal y Filipinas. (13)

Notice how Giménez-Caballero’s delirious logic simultaneously presents the fraternal love of _Hispanidad_ (in as much as this, and not military or economic might, is what is lacking in Spanish colonial rule) as the cause for the loss of the Philippines and the foundation for its potential return to Spain. The Filipino people, Giménez Caballero suggests, may not be under Spanish rule, but they are Spanish in spirit. Spain should be able to recover its colonies, if it can reconnect with the fraternal spirit that led its previous imperial expansion.

The sentimental logic of Hispanotropicalist discourse was stretched both ways. It was used to emphasize the sentimental bond of Spanish colonies to the metropolis, but it was also used to establish an aspirational bond between Spain and other powerful nations of the time by emphasizing a shared spirit rather than a common geopolitical situation. In the case of Asia, as I have mentioned before, Spain compared itself to Japan, an old, traditionalist empire that had managed to regain its position in the new world order, a resurgence that Spain aspired to emulate. Efforts to establish a parallelism between Spain and Japan can be traced back to the beginning of the XXth century, but, once more, the exalted prose of Giménez Caballero is one of the best examples of this aspect of Spanish colonialist discourse. In an essay published in the Falangist journal _Arriba_ in 1941, Giménez Caballero establishes a parallelism between Spanish and Japanese exceptionalism in the following terms:

Japón y España [son] ‘genios entre Oriente y Occidente.’ Japón tiene lo suficiente de Oriental para entender el alma del chino: pero también posee la suficiente dosis de espíritu ario para
colonizar esa raza de color. De la misma manera que España con los contactos milenarios con el Oriente ha sido capaz de comprender el corazón de berberiscos y de indios americanos. Y a la par: ha sido lo genialmente europea para alcanzar un vasto dominio sobre las gentes de color a través de los siglos y por mares nunca navegados. (quoted in Rodao 130)

Once more, Giménez Caballero invokes the exceptionality of the spirit of these hybrid peoples (the Spanish and the Japanese) as the force that drives past and present imperial endeavors for both countries. We can easily recognize in Giménez-Caballero’s praise of this exceptional spirit a Fascist rearticulation of the volkgeist as a tool of imperial expansion.

Needless to say that the exalted Japonismo that informs Giménez-Caballero’s article is deeply informed by the political juncture of the first half of 1941 when the possibility that Japan may hand over the Philippines to Spain had not vanished yet. An important sector of the Francoist regime had bet on this possibility. In fact, Serrano-Suñer, minister of foreign affairs and leader of the Falange after the series of internal purges that the party underwent between 1936 and 1939, staked his political career on the idea that the Japanese would eventually reward Spain for its close collaboration with the Nippon empire. The defense of the supposedly advantageous collaboration with Japan using an extreme version of Hispanotropicalist rhetoric that emphasized Hispanic-Japanese fraternity was consistent with Serrano-Suñer’s plan to increase Spain’s influence abroad (particularly in Latin America) by means of the ardent defense of the notion of Hispanidad. In defending the Hispanidad of both Japan and the Philippines, Giménez-Caballero, an intermittent member of the Falange, was merely providing the necessary language to implement Serrano-Suñer’s plan of proto-imperialist expansion through cultural propaganda. Millán-Astray’s translation was another piece of this puzzle of strategic alliances and delusional, imperialist dreams.

Associating the Spanish Foreign Legion to the Japanese spirit represented in Bushido was a good way to signal not only that Spain could recuperate its imperial vigor, but that it was precisely Franco’s militarized version of an authoritarian state that was best prepared to accomplish this goal. I am not arguing that Millán-Astray translation of Bushido was a key piece of Serrano-Suñer’s geopolitical strategy of Hispano-Japanese fraternity, but rather that Millán-Astray intended to associate himself with the orientalist sentiment that informed it. The position of the Francoist regime, as I explain next, shifted radically coinciding with the publication of Millán-Astray’s translation of Bushido. Millán-Astray’s Bushido was a late comer to the Japonist enthusiasm that had characterized early Francoism.

Later that year, when Japan refrained from helping Germany in its attack against the Soviet Union, it became obvious that the Nippon empire did not think that its interests were aligned with those of the Axis. The Soviet Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed in April 1941. When Germany began the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of that year, Japan decided to honor the pact and refrain from supporting the Germans. The timing of the publication of Millán-Astray’s translation, July 19 of 1941, could not have been more unfortunate. The book came out as the Francoist regime began to distance itself from Japan.

The promise of a Spanish return to the Philippines vanished and with it the political career of Serrano-Suñer, and, consequently, the influence of the Falange in the Francoist regime (Rodao 231). The fascination with everything Japanese that is present in the writings of Giménez-Caballero, Serrano-Suñer’s open collaboration with Japan, and ultimately Millán-Astray’s renewed interest in Bushido must be understood in the context of the political juncture of 1941, but I would argue that they should not be considered as an isolated episode. The fascination with Japan persisted years after the Francoist regime distanced itself from Japan and began maneuvering to align itself with the allies. Millán-Astray’s
translation of *Bushido* was published for the second time in 1943, ironically the same year that the Francoist regime began distancing itself from the Axis and courting the Allies, and as late as 1948, Admiral Carrero-Blanco remembered the patriotic *volkgeist* of the Japanese in unequivocally admiring terms. In *La guerra aeronaval*, Carrero-Blanco comments:

> El sintoísmo es en el fondo la religión de la patria del japonés. No tienen apego a la vida porque creen que, si la pierden, pasan a ser nada menos que parte de la divinidad. (quoted in Rodao 66)

The persistence of this belated *Japonismo* can be interpreted as the inadvertent *lapsus linguae* of a regime that tried desperately to re-articulate its position as the Axis stalled and the Allies began to gain momentum during the second part of World War II. One could also argue that the sporadic reappearance of Francoist Japonismo was characteristic of a regime that more often than not cultivated a rhetoric of deliberate ambivalence. As I have argued before, however, the haunting image of *Japonismo* cannot be easily exorcised as just a mere propaganda tool of the regime's imperialist agenda. I will now try to trace back the sources of Millán-Astray's *Japonismo* in an attempt to make visible the blurry line that often separated Francoist *Japonismo* from its liberal counterpart. Millán-Astray's brief introduction to his translation of *Bushido* can be extremely revelatory in this regard. In the prologue to his translation, Millán-Astray makes sure to explain to the reader: “Traduzco el Bushido limitándome a poner en castellano la edición francesa.” (9) A couple of paragraphs later, Millán-Astray informs us that:

> En el Bushido inspiré gran parte de mis enseñanzas morales a los cadetes de infantería en el Alcázar de Toledo [...] en los años de 1911-1912. Y también en el Bushido apoyé el credo de la Legión. (9)

His zeal in revealing the original source of his translation should surprise us since this is not an academic translation, and revealing that he is translating Nitobe's work indirectly from a translation diminishes the image that Millán-Astray wanted to portray of himself as the Spanish personification of the Samurai code of honor.

If we trust Millán-Astray's assertion that he had already read *Bushido* in 1911, we are left to ponder why he insists in telling us that his Spanish translation followed Charles Jacob's translation from the French (a fact that has been verified by Rodriguez-Navarro's analysis of the translation). Jacob's translation was not published until 1927, sixteen years after Millán-Astray's stay in Toledo, and seven years after the Spanish Foreign Legion was founded. It seems obvious that Millán-Astray must have read a different edition of *Bushido* before getting a hold of Jacob's translation, most likely Jiménez de la Espada’s 1909 translation.

We could argue that mentioning the existence of an earlier Spanish translation of *Bushido* could have also diminished Millán-Astray's image, and that of the Spanish Legion, as the personification of the imperialist drive that Japan represented. But, although the Spanish public at large may have been unaware of Jiménez de la Espada's translation of *Bushido*, they could not have possibly been unaware of the multiple manifestations of turn of the century Spanish *Japonismo* in literature, art, and in most of the increasingly popular magazines that were published during this period. By silencing the existence of Jiménez Espada's translation, Millán-Astray seems to imply that earlier translations had misrepresented the spirit of Nitobe's text, or, at the very least, that his belated *Japonismo* should not be associated with turn of the century Spanish liberal *Japonismo*. Millán-Astray's acknowledgment of the French source of his translation acts as a form of ghostly abjection.

Jiménez de la Espada's translation of *Bushido* was certainly more faithful to the
original text than Millán-Astray’s. As Rodríguez-Navarro tells us, unlike the 1941 Spanish translation, Jiménez de la Espada’s did not censor Nitobe’s references to masonic practices, marxism, or Spanish military defeats (172). Jiménez de la Espada, like Millán-Astray would later do in his own introduction, did, however, express his disappointment with the fact that Nitobe had made no mention to the Spanish chivalric tradition when comparing Japanese and European cultures. We can see in this emphasis on highlighting the similarities between the Spanish knights and the Japanese Samurai, an early formulation of the imperialist discourse that Giménez-Caballero would later take to an extreme. Other than these minor aspects, there is little difference in their interpretation of Nitobe’s original. I would contend that Millán-Astray’s effort to distance his translation from Jiménez de la Espada’s was not motivated by a disagreement with the latter’s interpretation of Nitobe’s work, but rather an effort to distance his translation from the ideological context in which Jiménez de la Espada’s translation was produced.

Jiménez de la Espada, like many of the leading Spanish liberal intellectuals that were seduced in the 1900s by the orientalist aesthetics of Japonismo, saw in Japan the example to follow for a much needed regeneration of Spain. Ramón y Cajal had praised the modernization of Japan in the acceptance speech he read on the occasion of his induction into the Spanish Academy of Sciences, and, Francisco Giner de los Ríos had expressed his admiration for the Japanese spirit and devotion to education in his “La educación moral en el Japón.” But if the regeneration advocated by Millán-Astray implied a return to an imperial project, the regeneration that the Spanish liberals associated with the image of Japan defended, at least in principle, the modernization of Spain along the path marked by the Enlightenment, advocating cultural relativism rather than imperial Eurocentrism. It seems fitting, accordingly, that Julián Besteiro would choose to translate in 1907 Lafcadio Hearn’s wildly popular Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life (1895). Unlike Nitobe’s description of the Samurai as Japanese versions of Christian knights, Hearn’s account of Japan is critical with the cultural colonization of the Nippon empire by the West. Hearn presents the Japanase as a man that after exploring the ways of the West decides to return to his own Japanese traditions, which he deems to be superior (Hearn 132-59).

Hearn’s critique of Western culture and praise of Japanese culture must have resonated with the Spanish left which Besteiro, president of the Spanish Socialist party, represented. In a delightful passage in which Hearn criticizes Western attachment to material possessions describing European leather shoes as the Western equivalent to foot-binding, we read:

> Now, with us, the common worker is incomparably less free than the common worker in Japan […]. In brief, then, he is less free because the common nature of his civilization numbs his natural power to live without machinery or large capital. (28)

If Millán-Astray’s Japonismo expressed a deep belief in the survival of the fittest nations, Besteiro’s Japonismo emphasized Spencerian Evolutionary ethics. For Millán-Astray only the strongest nations could lead and survive, for Besteiro ethical behavior was something that humankind could only aspire to in as much as it perfected itself by becoming selfless. Despite the evident differences between the Nitobe’s and Hearn’s work, I want to emphasize that conservatives and liberal intellectuals based their image of Japan on the same orientalist texts. As Geoffrey Searle observes, Lord Rosebery, Robert Baden-Powell, and H.G. Wells saw in Nitobe’s Bushido an example of the same Evolutionary Ethics that Besteiro may have seen in Kokoro (58-59).

The orientalist fascination with Japan, seemingly, served two different political agendas: the imperialist agenda of Spanish
Fascism, and the *regeneracionista* agenda of those that, like Besteiro, considered capitalism the obstacle to overcome. My description, so far, suggests that there might have been a *japonismo* of the Left and a *japonismo* of the Right. The ambivalence of orientalist discourse, however, is much more complex. I will return momentarily to Nitobe’s *Bushido* to try to demonstrate to what extent the oversimplification of *japonist* discourse into a Fascist appropriation of oriental knowledge vs. liberal orientalist critique of capitalism misses the point.

In her analysis of Millán-Astray’s translation of *Bushido*, Rodríguez-Navarro goes to great lengths to convince us that Millán-Astray betrayed the internationalist, pacifist, democratic spirit of Nitobe’s work. Millán-Astray, Rodríguez-Navarro argues, eliminates or distorts every positive mention of democracy by Nitobe, who, in turn, would be an ardent defender of democracy (227). It is true that Millán-Astray censored each and every mention of democracy in his translation, but Nitobe’s view of democracy is certainly not without problems. *Bushido* is not only an account of the similarities between European and Japanese cultures, but also a critique of democracy in as much as the democratic system invalidates the code of honor on which European chivalry and the Japanese Samurai based their existence. Bushido is based on the notion of honor, Nitobe tells us, and, honor is a “class spirit” based on trust. “The irresistible tide of triumphant democracy, which can tolerate no form or shape of trust” will eventually render Bushido extinct, he warns us (184). The vulgarization of modern life, in other words the abolishment of class structures, Nitobe tells us, is also putting an end to the notions of honor that are needed in society. In Nitobe’s words:

The state built upon the rock of Honor and fortified by the same—shall we call it the Ehrenstaat, or, after the manner of Carlyle, the Heroarchy?—is fast falling into the hands of quibbling lawyers and gibbering politicians armed with logic chopping engines of war. (184-85)

Nitobe struggles with the transition from the notion of the *volkgeist*, the spirit of the race channeled by its most prominent representatives, to the notion of the demos, the will of the people represented by, in his opinion, its lowest common denominator. Culture is for him the work of gentlemen and not of commoners. The question for Nitobe is: how can democracies coexist with the aristocratic spirit that made their nations great? (159).

In the case of Hearn, the aristocratic overtones of Nitobe’s orientalist discourse are certainly softened, but his critique of Western culture echoes some of the points raised by the author of *Bushido*. Disgusted by the pervasive presence of Western culture in turn of the century Japan, Hearn comments: “Setting the whole Japanese nation to study English (the language of a people who are being forever preached to about their ‘rights,’ and never about their ‘duties’) was almost an imprudence” (119). The emphasis on individualistic rights in the West is contrasted with the selfless commitment to the good of the nation in the East. It is this selflessness that Hearn admires most in Japanese culture, and he does not hesitate to recommend that the West imitate the East: “[i]ndividualism is today the enemy of education, as it is also the enemy of social order […]. It is against individualism that the work will have to be done” (39).

Hearn’s praise of Japanese selflessness, however, is not to be confused with altruistic pacifism. The Japanese *volkgeist* described in *Kokoro* produced not only a highly creative culture, but also a highly effective war machine. In the story titled “After the War,” Hearn tells us that the new Japan has achieved its regeneration through war. The complete, but unemotional, commitment to the conquest of China that marked the resurgence of the Nippon empire “is a race feeling, which repeated triumphs have served only to strengthen” (74).
Besteiro’s repeated calls for the *japonización* of Spain, like those made by other *regeneracionistas* on the left, were doubly appealing in that they promised the demise of capitalism and the reinvigoration of Spain’s position in the international community. The idea that Spain could regain its international prestige without renouncing proletarian struggle was shared by many on the left, let us not forget that Marxism did not provide a clear position on, let alone against, colonialism.

The enthusiastic praise of the Nippon selfless army that Besteiro’s translation brought to Spanish audiences in 1907, however, quickly turned sour. The events of the massacre of Barranco del lobo in 1909, in which more that 1,000 Spanish soldiers perished at the hands of Riffian guerrillas, were a stark reminder that regeneration through war came at a cost. The high number of casualties was especially poignant for those on the left because they were mainly sustained by members of the proletariat and rural communities who could not afford to pay their way out of the draft like their bourgeois counterparts often did. As early 1910, Besteiro, like many in the Spanish Socialist party, were quite aware of the contradictions between imperialism and proletarian revolution. In an article titled “Imperialismo y Revolución,” Besteiro summed up his position in the following terms:

> Guerra; esta es la tesis del imperialismo nacional. Revolución; esta es la antítesis del proletariado internacionalista que recuerda cómo la gran Revolución Francesa libertó las colonias americanas, y promete, con la revolución social, la libertad de los trabajadores sometidos a la tiranía económica y política en los dominios del Asia y del Africa. (162)

Despite the bluntness of these words, the innate contradiction of Besteiro’s brand of socialist *regeneracionismo* persisted. As Paul Preston points out, the socialists would end up paying less attention to the syndical battles “than the parliamentary campaign against the Moroccan war and the King’s alleged responsibility for the great defeat of Annual” (Origins, 104). In fact, the concern of the Spanish socialists for the colonial question ended up subverting the radical anticolonialist agenda implicit in Besteiro’s words. In a 1921 speech titled “El Partido Socialista ante el problema de Marruecos,” in which Besteiro builds his case against the Spanish monarchy, we can clearly appreciate that his position had shifted. There was very little mention in this speech to the social injustice that the death of scores of working class soldiers represented, but the most surprising aspect of the speech is that rather than condemning colonialism, Besteiro chastises the Spanish government for not being capable of pursuing a proper imperialist enterprise. The French, Besteiro tells us, have implemented a scientific and highly effective colonización,

> A la acción de las armas en el pueblo francés sigue la actuación de toda la cultura francesa; y desgraciadamente, a la acción de nuestro ejército no puede seguir la actuación de la cultura española, porque este es un país que está profundamente en crisis desde el punto de vista económico y desde el punto de vista cultural. (Besteiro 90)

It is quite likely that, in pressuring the Spanish government to prosecute the Spanish king for his responsibility in the massacre of Annual, Besteiro was trying to provoke a schism between the Spanish aristocracy and the Spanish bourgeoisie. This, in turn, would have resulted in the type of bourgeois revolution that Besteiro, a firm believer in Kautsky’s theories of moderate revolution, felt was needed before the proletariat could gain access to power. As we shall see, however, political theory did not always follow political praxis in the case of Besteiro and the Spanish Socialist Party.

In the months and years following the disaster of Annual, Besteiro and the Socialist Party would take the notion of a moderate revolution, the idea that the defense of the
proletariat should coexist with the bourgeois order, to its ultimate, and illogical consequences. After Primo de Rivera’s coup d’état, the PSOE and UGT would become the only workers’ organizations tolerated by the dictatorship, often acting as the mediators between the new totalitarian state and the proletariat. Besteiro would argue until almost the very end of the dictatorship that the defense of proletarian rights could still be advanced in a totalitarian state. The pervasive corruption of the political parties, prior to the Primo de Rivera coup d’état, can partially explain Besteiro’s position, but, even in this context, it seems obvious that Besteiro, a professor of logic, had ended up subverting his own rationale for the coexistence of revolution and democracy, and become the enabler of an antidemocratic regime.

Reading Besteiro’s speeches brings to mind the image of the selfless Japanese army described by Hearn and Nitobe, because for Besteiro, at this point in his life, the problem is one of leadership and not of the capitalist system in which that leadership acts. If the Besteiro of 1910 had denounced the connivance between capitalism and imperialism, the Besteiro of 1921 demands that the imperialist campaign be led properly. The problem is no longer that capitalism systematically oppresses the proletariat at home and in the colonies, but that the people are orphaned by leaders.

I would not conflate Besteiro’s call for leadership for the proletariat with the Fascist praise of strong leaders to direct the fascio exemplified by Millán-Astray or Giménez-Caballero. Besteiro’s political agenda was, despite its contradictions, one of social re-generation and expansion of workers’ rights, very far from Millán-Astray’s totalitarian, imperialistic agenda. But, at the core of both Besteiro’s moderate Socialism and Millán-Astray’s idiosyncratic brand of Fascism there is a common concern with how to tame the ghost of the people. I am arguing that one of the representations that articulated the unresolved conflicts that haunted both political movements was precisely the orientalist representation of Japan that captured the imagination of both Spanish conservatives and liberals during the first half of the twentieth century. The ambivalence of Japonismo with its selfless, manageable, crowds represented a utopic view of the possibility of channeling the unbridled power of the masses, a source of anxiety for both Fascist and Socialist leaders. Interestingly, Besteiro was not unaware of the seductive power of aesthetic discourse, and often felt the need to explain that a common aesthetic project may respond to opposite political agendas. He discussed this issue at length in an article titled “Romanticismo y Socialismo” published in 1930, and then again in an article titled “La sistematización del Fascismo,” that included a section titled “Fascismo y romanticismo,” published in 1935. In the 1930 article, Besteiro concluded warning his fellow Socialists against the manipulative use of the term romantic, 

¡A nombre del romanticismo no nos prediquéis nada, porque muchas veces el romanticismo está mezclado con elementos que nosotros no queremos de ninguna manera asimilar y cuya influencia procuraremos evitar! Pero si se trata de lo que hay en el movimiento de libertador y de verdaderamente progresivo, ¡ah!, entonces tendremos que decir que los románticos somos nosotros, y, en vista del erial que por todas partes nos circunda, estoy por añadir que somos los únicos románticos. (628)

One would think that in the mid 1930s, Besteiro, critical with the ambivalent politics of romanticism, had already overcome the equally ambivalent fascination for the orderly crowds represented by Japonismo, yet as late as 1933, Besteiro reiterated his concern for the potentially destructive power of the masses. In a speech read in response to the radicalization of the Spanish Socialist Party that followed the ascent to power of the conservative forces during the II Spanish Republic, Besteiro warned:

y si se constituyera una República Socialista dictatorial, el Estado entonces no sería una democracia primitiva, ni una democracia moderna, sino que sería un Gobierno
constituido por Socialistas para realizar una obra no Socialista o ligeramente Socialista, rigiendo a todo el país autocráticamente y con la mayor severidad. ¿Se quiere esto? Pues digase claro. Pero quisiera que los iniciadores de esa idea meditasen sobre su responsabilidad, para que un día no nos viésemos envueltos en una acción dudosa que, según mi punto de vista, nos desacreditaría. (quoted in Bizcarrondo, 216)

Besteiro was in the difficult position of trying to mediate between those that considered that the existing democracy was just a bourgeois state, claiming that the demos represented by it did not include the proletariat, and those like himself that advocated for a practical expansion of rights for the proletariat within the existing bourgeois order. His commitment to expanding workers’s rights through political praxis rather than political dogma was epitomized in his refusal to abandon Madrid after all other republican leaders and politicians on the left had long moved to Valencia. As Santos Juliá explains, the same reasons that had led Besteiro to negotiate with Primo de Rivera informed his decision to stay in Madrid to negotiate with Franco. (Juliá-Diaz, 447-9) Interestingly, historiographical accounts of Besteiro’s political career tend to criticize his collaboration with Primo de Rivera, but praise his readiness to negotiate with Franco, which eventually led to Besteiro’s death, as heroic.

His decision to stay put and attempt a negotiation with the Francoist rebels can be considered heroical in at least one of the many senses of this word. Besteiro considered until the last minute that his civic duty as a leader of the Socialist party was to find a political praxis within which the war could be stopped, and orderly coexistence continued. His belief in the goodwill of the rebels, and the basic trust required to engage in negotiations with them, indicate to what extent Besteiro’s political convictions were informed by the notion of the Heroarchy that had been so central to the success of Japonismo. The radicalization of the II Republic from 1934 on, and the blatant populism that had characterized the general political discourse during that time must have confirmed Besteiro’s deepest fears about the irreversible results that crossing the line that separates democracy from the dictatorship of the majority entails. Besteiro’s seemingly irrational decision to wait for the rebels in Madrid was an act of strict ideological coherence for someone that strived throughout his life to lead the proletarian struggle from above, and not from behind. In this sense, Besteiro’s heroical decision to lead until the very end is the necessary counterpart of someone who struggled with an aristocratic notion of the volkgeist and tried to put it at the service of the proletariat in a democratic system.

I have argued that Spanish Japonismo is, among other things, an expression of the uneasiness of Spanish liberals and conservatives with the notion of the democratic liberal state. I am not arguing that Spanish liberal regeneracionismo, of which Besteiro’s brand of Socialism was one representative, was the same thing than the imperialist Fascism represented by Millán-Astray and Giménez-Caballero. The relative ease, however, with which the orientalist rhetoric of turn of the century, liberal, Japonismo was appropriated by conservative writers such as Giménez-Caballero speaks not only to the deliberate attempt of Fascism to co-opt Socialist discourse, but also to the fact that both discourses are haunted by a common ghost, that of the unbridled power of the masses. My analysis of the ambivalent politics of Japonismo as exemplified by the work of Millán-Astray, Besteiro, and Giménez-Caballero also speaks to the ability of aesthetics to contain multiple ideological discourse, particularly at times like the first half of the XXth century when the relative stability of ideology slipped into the psychosis of war.
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