"The Paradigm Wars" in Educational Administration: an Attempt at Transcendence

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Abstract: *This article addresses the "paradigm wars" (Gage, 1989; Anderson & Herr, 1999) as they are manifested in educational administration through consideration of text and discourse in that field.[1] The paradigm wars in educational administration represent a deep-seated division in the field between, for example, those who might be termed positivists and those who might be termed post-positivists - although each of these terms is contested. The division however is more deep-seated and the differences are said to be epistemological (Willower & Forsyth, 1999).*
The author shows that what differences exist are not just epistemological, but ontological as well. In fact, examining educational administration text samples from a linguistic, anthropological perspective (Duranti, 1997), it is suggested that the differences exhibited are cultural. Based on this line of argument, can these differences be overcome and, if so, how might that happen?
This article begins with a brief discussion of the paradigm wars, including its genesis. Examples from the scholarship in educational administration are discussed and analysed, employing a relatively simple discourse analysis and an anthropological or ethnographic lens. Finally, Kegan's (1994) levels of consciousness framework is applied to the paradigm wars in an effort to transcend them. Implications for educational administrator preparation are discussed.

The Paradigm Wars in Educational Administration: a Brief History

Deep and heartfelt differences threatened to rend the educational research community of scholars in the early to mid- Eighties. The differences at that time were seen as a debate among researchers holding to different epistemologies, especially between those who advocated qualitative research and those who advocated quantitative research (Smith, 1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986). This disagreement was variously referred to as a debate (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; Eisner & Peshkin, 1990) and a dialog (Guba, 1990) between paradigms. Gage (1989) points to changing views on teaching and research on teaching as a milestone in what he termed "the Paradigm Wars". This was the first time, to my knowledge, that this phrase was used. Employing the terminology of its critics, Gage referred to the then mainstream view as "'positivistic social science'" (p. 4). The alternative views Gage identified as "the anti-naturalist," "the interpretivist" and "the critical theorist critiques".

The paradigm wars affected educational administration, with critics such as Thomas Greenfield squared off against more mainstream scholars such as Donald Willower (Gail Furman-

Brown, personal communication, April 11, 2001). In an analysis of organizational culture, Angus (1996) described one perspective in this paradigm war as the mainstream (which itself had both functionalist and interpretivist "camps"). This perspective, according to Angus, was firmly entrenched in the human relations tradition. In criticizing the mainstream, Angus wrote, "both mainstream conceptions of organizational culture (which have been enthusiastically and uncritically appropriated into educational administration) reduce the complexity of culture to an almost absurd level of simplicity by emphasizing only that culture creates consensus" (p. 976). According to Angus, the human relations approach draws upon a rational model of organizations. This rational model and its adherents emphasized "technical, managerial management" and "embraced a fairly simplistic form of positivism" (p. 979). The features of the conventional approach were, for Angus, "the rational model, positivist methodology, and the dominance of administrative-technical concerns" (p. 980).

An opposing perspective for Angus (1996) is the critical approach to educational administration, begun with Greenfield's critiques of the conventional perspective (p. 978). Greenfield's contribution, according to Angus, was to posit that, rather than focusing on "management, techniques of management control, or universal laws of administration" (p. 979), the focus ought to be on "ordinary participants and their day-to-day social interaction" (ibid.). The critical perspective introduces issues of power, agency, and social justice into analyzing organizational cultures and educational administration. Basically, for Angus' analysis, there are two sides in the paradigm wars: the mainstream (including the "functionalists" or "technicists" and the mainstream interpretivists, both coming from a human relations perspective) versus those of a critical persuasion.

The broadsides and volleys of the early skirmishes in the paradigm wars in educational administration still echo in its scholarship today (and will be the subject of at least part of the analysis to follow) (see, for example, English, 2000, 2001a; Hoy, 2001; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000; Waite, 2001).

Analysis

Discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1989; Gee, 1999) has proven effective in analyzing language in educational administration, whether that language was spoken (Corson, 1995, 2000; Wodak, 1995) or written (Anderson, 2001). With something as complex as language, especially language in use, analysis can employ one or a combination of several different approaches and be of varying depth levels. The first level of analysis of the text may be a relatively simple content analysis, or a word count. A second-level analysis is an examination of the words used for their surface-level meaning(s).[2]

First example

Handbooks of research, generally, are presumed to be authoritative texts, representing the authoritative voices in a particular field. The Handbook of Research on Educational Administration (Murphy & Louis, 1999) is no exception. The first chapter in the second edition of the book is a brief history of scholarship on educational administration (Willower & Forsyth, 1999).

In the text by Willower and Forsyth (1999, p. 4) cited above, the use of inflammatory and otherwise stilted language reveals the authors' perspectives and passions. To describe what are to them non-conventional perspectives in/of educational administration, under the subheading of "Reliance on Logic and Evidence," these authors employ phrases such as: "attacks on science and

its methods"-which were, to them, "essentially derivative"; "such attacks were abetted by the resurgence of subjectivist and neo-Marxist thought and the spread of postmodernist and poststructural views"; "these perspectives tended to stress advocacy and political agendas and either downplayed or rejected scientific inquiry"; and the non-conventional writing "from such sources tended to be prose arguments rather than empirical research".

Here, we have a case of simple binary opposition: good versus bad. Attacks on science and its methods cannot be good, especially when abetted (defined by Webster's New World(Dictionary [1994, p. 2] as "to incite, sanction, or help, esp. in wrongdoing") by subjectivism and neo-Marxist thought-which, by this time had come to be repudiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union proved this social experiment to have been misguided, especially in the minds of social conservatives. To describe the increasing influence of "postmodernist" and "poststructuralist" views (these not even given the credibility or status of philosophies or schools of thought, but views) as a "spread" likens their increasing influence to the infestation characteristic of a disease. That these "perspectives" (again, not philosophies in their own right) stressed advocacy and political agendas, to the conservative, dare I say, positivist mind, is unpardonable, given the positivist's preference for objectivism (over, say, subjectivism) and value-neutral science. The coup de grace, to these authors' way of thinking, is delivered in the final sentence of the passage quoted, where the authors dismiss these attacks, views, and perspectives as being "prose arguments" (not given the legitimacy of logic or even rhetoric) "rather than empirical research." Again, we see the binary opposition: views and perspectives versus science and empirical research; hardly, in these authors' eyes, could the work they demonize be considered research, or even scholarship (that is, because it is prose). And the fact that these attacks are seen as derivative means that they are not even original. In an extremely critical discussion of those "whose predilections are antiscience" (Willower & Forsyth, 1999, p. 4), the authors attempt to undermine others' arguments by claiming that, even though they are anti-science, they still use the methods of science, that being logical argument: "those who oppose science are caught in the logic of argument." "Logical argument," the authors maintain, "is also at the heart of scientific interpretation and explanation." They aver that "logic provides a critical criterion" of the efficacy of science and scientific interpretation. "In the realm of empirical research, if one casts aside the norms and standards of science," they continue,

> the work appears flawed to other researchers. It is attention to these norms and standards . . . that confers legitimacy in matters of inquiry. A commitment to logic and evidence remains the touchstone of quality in educational administration, despite debates about philosophy and science. (ibid.)

Though these authors repeatedly invoke evidence and logic as essential criteria in science, especially empirical research, they fail to define the terms or elaborate on them. They enumerate no essential characteristics of either logic or evidence. These norms and standards remain unexamined.

Wayne Hoy, a student of Willower's, wrote a eulogy on the occasion of Willower's death, published in the newsletter of The University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), The UCEA Review. In it, Hoy (2001, p. 2) wrote of Willower, that he saw writing and publication as ends in themselves and that writing and publication "were embodied in his view of science as self-critical and self-correcting". Hoy did elaborate a bit on what he perceived the norms of science to be: "The norms of science include skeptical, open-mindedness, impersonal criteria of assessment, and publication of results." Citing Willower, Hoy stated that:

> *it is no wonder that he railed against those in educational administration who attacked science as an inappropriate road to knowledge. . . . [He] believed and demonstrated in his own scholarship, writing, and behavior that a scientific approach provided a guide to thoughtful action; indeed, he argued that it was "startlingly superior to such alternatives as authority, faith, intuition or tradition. . . . (Willower, 1994, p. 470)." (ibid.)*

Here, as in the preceding passage by Willower and Forsyth (1999), we again see the binary opposition of what these three authors see as "the scientific approach"-which is superior-set against those who attack science and set against authority, faith, intuition and tradition. In each of the texts cited above, words such as "attack," "railed," "anti-science," "abetted," and others may be taken to be inflammatory, lending credence to the interpretation that there is indeed a "paradigm war" underway. At any rate, such language serves as an identifier; identifying sides (or at least one side, for I'm nearly certain that those against whom Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy "rail" would be slow to accept the identifiers attributed to them). Though sections of Willower and Forsyth's chapter speak of unity within the field of educational administration, such as a commitment to logic and evidence being a unifying factor for scholars in educational administration (Willower and Forsyth, 1999, p. 4), such language and the divisions it draws clearly work against any such unification.

Second example

More recently, there has been a debate surrounding the formation and implementation of the Interstate Leadership Licensure Consortium standards in the United States (Anderson, 2001; English, 2000; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000). As with the texts cited above, the textual products of this more recent exchange can be seen as an example of the paradigm wars.

The particular exchange cited here began with a journal article describing the implementation of the Standards (Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000). This was followed in short order (English, 2000) by an attack upon the Standards and the assumptions of the authors of the article that described their implementation. In critiquing the authors and the Standards, English writes,

> *The ISLLC standards must be envisioned as universal and inclusive. If there is anything important to know outside the standards, the claim for exclusivity upon which licensure rests comes up hollow. The authors pose this as a dilemma and beg the question by resorting to privileging "those dimensions that focused on shaping and directing the core technology". (p. 164)*

English associates the notion of a core technology with the notion of organizational rationality. He criticized the Standards and the authors' promotion of them as "belief statements based on metaphysical tenets as opposed to empirical positions" (p. 164). Later, English states that "[the] ISLLC standards are an example of a pseudo scientific agenda shaped into . . . scientific ideology" (p. 165), and concludes:

> *School administrators and professors who prepare them see their work in scientific, neutral, and moral terms, as do the authors of this article [i.e., Murphy, et al.]. They fail to perceive themselves as political players in an ideological struggle for power and domination within the larger social order. (p. 165).*

Responding to English's criticism, Murphy (2000) stated that the authors of the Standards sought out criticism and critique of them, but that

> *[on] the other hand, it would probably be helpful if these analyses were based on the design of the Standards or on the Standards themselves. However, none of the strategies that English employs-imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism-meets this criterion.³ (p. 411)*

In his conclusion, Murphy reiterates that the Standards "should be subject to analysis and critique," and that the critique "should be connected to the Standards and the intellectual infrastructure on which they are built" (p. 414). He ends his rejoinder by stating that, "Because English fails to address this basic criterion, his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" (p. 414).

The reader of these texts is left with the sense that these two authors are speaking past each other-each steadfastly holding onto his (in this case) beliefs. This is based on the passion with which each writes, as evidenced by the 'loaded' language used (i.e., "belief statements based on metaphysical tenets as opposed to empirical positions" and "an example of a pseudo scientific agenda shaped into . . . scientific ideology" in English's case; and "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" and "his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" in Murphy's case). It is . doubtful that either author will alter his beliefs based on the arguments of the other.

If a change of mind is unlikely (though this is an interpretation of mine and not explicitly supported by the texts in question), what is the intent of the authors? In all likelihood, the intent of the authors in the above case could be at least two-fold: to "score points" in an argument and, thereby, 1) gain adherents to one's position, and/or 2) influence educational policy through influencing policymakers. These possibilities introduce the performative function/aspect of language and call attention to the potential audience for such texts. Also if, in Hegelian dialectical terms (thesis plus antithesis equals synthesis), each position presents the other's antithesis, and if, as I've suggested above, the authors are unlikely to alter their positions based on the exchange of ideas presented, then from where is the synthesis likely to come? The most likely candidate to provide a synthesis is a third party, a disinterested third party probably.

A third party did enter this particular debate (Anderson, 2001), though his level of disinterestedness is open to question; his article being a critical discourse analysis of the ISLLC Standards. This author undertook a thorough deconstruction of both the Standards and the examinations that are coming on line to assess educational administration students' supposed understanding and application of them. While the Standards were the main focus of the article, the author did manage to ally himself with English's position and attempted to undermine Murphy's. In an aside centered on the remark of Murphy's cited above (i.e., where Murphy criticized English's "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" [Murphy, 2000, p. 411]), Anderson chides Murphy for "taking pointed-headed academics to task" (p. 200). In a footnote to his "pointed-headed academics" phrase, Anderson notes:

> *This ploy to marginalise "academics", particularly those who engage in critical theory, is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which being that it would disqualify Murphy himself. Epistemologically it is flawed because being immersed in practice can be either an advantage or a disadvantage as both insider and outsider perspectives are needed. It also sets up a*

false dichotomy since most academics in educational administration have themselves been educational administrators and tend to work closely with administrators. Both are true for both myself and Fenwick English. (fn. 2, p. 214)

While it is difficult to argue with Anderson's points, it is clear that he allies himself more readily with English than he does with Murphy, and perhaps in some way attempts to marginalise Murphy and his views. For though Anderson doesn't recognize it publicly, Murphy, too, has been an educational administrator "at the school, district, and state levels" (from his biographical note, Murphy, 2000, p. 411). Anderson is correct that Murphy is an academic and would subject himself to the criticism he levels at English if the operant word in the phrase "pointed-head academics" was academics. If not, then the operant term and criticism would be "pointed-headed", and not "academic." For as Anderson points out about practice-that immersion in it can be an advantage or a disadvantage—the same could be said of academics. Therefore, it is neither one's biographical experience nor his/her current position vis-à-vis practice that matters, but the stance, ideological or otherwise, that one takes to the issue in question. Still, it seems as though in this debate we are left waiting for yet another third party to provide a synthesis of the polar positions.

Common sense as a cultural system

That Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy, in the chapter and article cited, neglect to stipulate what they mean by logic and evidence, especially, suggests that, to them, these concepts fall within the realm of "what everybody knows." That is, logic and evidence take on the status of being common sense; this might apply to empiricism more generally.

Logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy; yet, Willower and Forsyth (1999, p. 10) admit that "scholars [in educational administration] often have limited training in philosophy." These authors emphatically state that, "Logical argument is also at the heart of scientific interpretation and explanation" and that "logic provides a critical criterion of the efficacy of science and scientific interpretation" (p. 4). If logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy, and if, as the authors state, scholars in educational administration have little or no training in philosophy, where are these scholars to have gotten training in logic and its application? The authors don't say. We are left to assume that knowledge of logic and its application are just common sense.

Though Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy would probably be reluctant to accept such an analysis, their beliefs in logic and evidence, and in other norms and standards to which they ascribe, constitute a cultural system; if not a cultural system per se, at least a subculture within the culture of American academic research. And if what English (2000, p. 160) asserts about the formation of the ISLLC Standards is true (i.e., that they "were established via 'professional consensus'"), this consensus reflects "common sense" (i.e., norms) and thereby is reflective of a cultural system. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1983) described common sense as a cultural system.

The cultural systems represented by the beliefs of Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, Murphy, and English can be seen in terms of what anthropologists refer to as an emic system. Geertz (1983) uses the term "experience near" similarly. Geertz asserts that,

> *People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, unself-consciously, as it were colloquially; they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any "concepts" involved at all. That is what experience-near means—that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together. (p. 58)*

The elements in a culture thought to be common sense,

> are conflated into comprising one large realm of the given and undeniable, a catalog of in-the-grain-of-nature realities so peremptory as to force themselves upon any mind sufficiently unclouded to receive them. Yet this is clearly not so. . . . Religion rests its case on revelation, science on method, ideology on moral passion; but common sense rests its on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a nutshell. The world is its authority. (Geertz, 1983, p. 75)

So it is that common sense, for Geertz, is a cultural system. There are, perhaps, common sense aspects to all cultural systems. If this is true, and if the "sides" in the so-called paradigm wars represent different systems of belief, different ontologies, different cultures, then we can safely assume that the position(s) Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy criticize (sometimes referred to as "subjectivist," "critical theory," "anti-science," and so on) has its own set of common sense beliefs. In seeking to understand those common sense beliefs, the researcher must detail those aspects of each system that "might be called its stylistic features, the marks of attitude that give it its peculiar stamp" (Geertz, 1983, p. 85); for only in doing so, can the common sense systems "be transculturally characterized."

An emic or experience-near system is self-referential. That is, being derived from the linguistic term "phonemic" (Pike, 1965), an emic system can be seen as a whole, whose parts are related only to other parts within the system. For the present analysis, such systems may also be termed language or discourse communities. An etic system of analysis, on the other hand, is representative of the total universe of possible occurrences. Such a system of analysis is what Geertz and others (e.g., Agar, 1980) refer to as experience distant (see, also, Anderson & Herr, 1999).

The relation between culture and language is complex, though language is believed to represent the consciousness of the user (Garmston, Kaiser & Lipton, 1998). The linguistic anthropological analysis above is bolstered by consideration of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Agar, 1994). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis-a synthesis of the thought of linguistic anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf-holds there to be a relation between the language a people speaks and their culture. The strong version of the hypothesis holds that culture determines language; the weak version of the hypothesis simply holds there to be a correlation. If this part of my thesis holds-that is, that the differing sides in the paradigm wars may represent different, distinct cultures-this has ramifications for the question of incommensurability (Donmoyer, 1999) between the sides.

Simplistic Thinking and Models

Cross-cultural (mis)understanding

Conceiving of the differing sides of the so-called paradigm wars as differing cultures allows us recourse to the extensive literature of cross- or inter-cultural communication (e.g., Scollon & Scollon, 1995) as a possible vehicle for analysis. Two cultural phenomena relevant to the present discussion are those of socialization and labeling or stereotyping (Scollon & Scollon, 1995). Scollon and Scollon note how negative stereotyping creates problems in intercultural communication in that it permits the characteristics of different groups to be framed as polar opposites (p. 160). This us/them dichotomization inhibits communication and understanding. The binary oppositions employed by the authors cited earlier are examples of such dichotomization and their use contributes to severe negative consequences. Binary oppositions,

us/them stereotyping and labeling result from overly simplistic thinking. Social psychologists treat similar phenomena through application of attribution theory, especially fundamental attribution errors (Ross, 1977; Gardner, 1991). Such errors, essentially errors of stereotyping, result from overly simplistic application of empirical observation and assumptions concerning peoples' behaviors-peoples' behaviors are erroneously assumed to be caused by the peoples' inherent characteristics (e.g., they are "bad" people, or they are anti-science and subjectivist), rather than as a result of more complex situational factors.

Such erroneous, negative, and cognitively simplistic thinking results in members of opposing camps adopting what Geertz (2000, p. 50) refers to as the "if you don't believe in my God you must believe in my Devil" assumption, where people (the members of the opposition) are accused of holding absurd positions, "which no one in any seriousness holds" (p. 50), simply if they don't adhere to the opposing party's position. Claims by Willower and Forsyth (1999), cited above, that those who take an opposing view to them are "anti-science" is such an absurd position. It is hard to imagine anyone being "anti-science." And, other than a gratuitous assault on Thomas Greenfield, the authors provide no evidence of those who may hold such an absurd position. True, scholars may criticize the privileged position so-called positivist epistemologies hold in the academy and the hypocrisy of the objectivist and value-neutral claims of those who extol the virtues of that method; still, one can scarcely imagine anyone who is truly anti-science. Is that possible in this day and age?

Socialization into a discourse community

Another relevant cultural phenomenon for the issue under discussion is that of socialization (or enculturation). Scollon and Scollon (1995) identify two primary means by which individuals are socialized into discourse communities-through the natural processes of birth and growth within a family and community, and through socialization into a discourse community (such as a profession or discipline), usually done freely for utilitarian purposes (p. 136).

That socialization relates to issues surrounding the "paradigm wars" is exemplified in Hoy's (2001) eulogy to Willower in which he discusses his teacher's progeny, among other topics. Hoy writes of the hundreds of students ("his professional sons and daughters, grandsons and granddaughters, and great-grandchildren" [p. 2]) in the "Willower lineage," that, through "[a] conservative interpolation yields an estimate of nearly 100 professors and 300 practitioners who are Willower descendents" (p. 15). Of only the first generation of the "Willower lineage," Hoy states that it forms "the foundation of a lineage that is wide and vast, spanning a half dozen countries and reproducing themselves many times over" (p. 15). Extolling the accomplishments of the descendents of Willower, Hoy states that "[to] say that Don Willower's contribution to educational administration was large is an understatement. He left a remarkable living legacy, one that will continue to grow and enrich the field as the years go by" (p. 15).

As is the case in the stereotyping and the black/white, good/bad dichotomization, and the vilification of the opposing "camp" in Willower and Forsyth's (1999) language above, Hoy's (2001) conceptualization of progeny and influence is overly simplistic and overblown. Intellectual influence is not genetic material, to be passed on *in toto* and received passively. It is not cloning. Socialization is an interactive social process (Varenne & McDermott, 1999). Later, I will elaborate on overly simplistic thinking, the lack of complexity of the models we use, and the ramifications of these limitations for us. For now, we must consider that socialization to the norms of a profession and its discourse community-in this case, educational administration-may be another function or aspect of the performative nature of the texts in question.

Language Games

Another analytical lens through which we could view the so-called paradigm wars and the volleys, the texts, such wars produce is that of language games (Wittgenstein, 1953). Wittgenstein claimed that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (p. 8e) and that, "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, [is] the 'language-game'" (1953, p. 5e). Wittgenstein fostered thinking of language in more complex ways than had heretofore been the case. He gestured toward a more complex, socio-historical conceptualization of language:

> Just as a move in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and so on. (p. 17e)

A socio-historical analysis of language, of discourse and text, such as that intimated by Wigggenstein is similar to a Bakhtinian perspective. Bakhtin (1981) held that words came to us already always encrusted with meaning and that such words and their meaning were ideological (Volosinov, 1973/1986). Not only that, but such words (this includes texts) are spoken into such already politically-loaded situations, and done so in such a way that the speaker recognizes and even anticipates the hearer's (or reader's) perception of the word, his/her perceptual horizon. The texts we have been examining fall prey to such influences as well. As such, these texts, rather than being simply-that-which-they-seem, are multifaceted, complex, even (self-)contradictory.

Consideration of the paradigm wars as a type of language game prompts us to enquire as to what kinds of moves the texts by Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy represent. First, as the relatively simple content analysis above attempted to demonstrate, on the superficial level, the simply-that-which-they-seem level, the texts in question represent an identification, a call to allegiance: This (our side) is good; it is science and we are scholars. The simply-that-which-it-seems level of the Hoy (2001) eulogy is that of a tribute, though it too demonstrates a taking-of-sides and a vilification of the other, and by aligning himself with Willower, Hoy seeks to be included among the scholars, the scientists. In lauding Willower, Hoy touted Willower's beliefs that a "scientific approach provided a guide to thoughtful action, indeed, he argued that it was 'startlingly superior to such alternatives as authority, faith, intuition or tradition'. . . . (Willower, 1994, p. 470)" (Hoy, 2001, p. 2). Hoy applauded Willower and his science; its processes, which are believed to be self-critical and self-correcting; and its norms, skeptical, open-minded, and impersonal. And though Willower and Forsyth (1999) claim that pursuit of such scientific processes has resulted in "generating knowledge and resolving problems" (p. 11), they show no willingness to accept that such goals may be circular, insular, and self-referential (an emic system, see discussion above). As English (2001b) has demonstrated, there has been no paradigm shift in educational administration, only a recentering and a shifting of the margins within the same paradigm. Similarly, Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English (2000), and Murphy employ circular, self-referential reasoning. The knowledge generation and problem resolution Willower and Forsyth trumpet may not be as remarkable as they claim if there are only incremental shifts in the frame within à singular paradigm. Schön (1989) lends credence to this analysis when he commented that:

> *Complexity and uncertainty are not dissolved through application of specialized knowledge to well-defined tasks; on the contrary, tasks become well-defined through the restructuring of complex and uncertain solutions. The irreducible element of art in practice cannot be reduced to the exercise of*

known technique. Problem-finding has no place in a body of professional knowledge concerned exclusively with problem-solving. One cannot rely on professional expertise in order to choose among competing paradigms of professional practice. (p. 191)

Commenting on a similar process, Wittgenstein (1953) noted how:

We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic. . . The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. . . The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.— Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off. (p. 45e).

The science of Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy and the empiricism English seems to champion in his critique of Murphy can never be self-correcting or self-critical if they are paradigmatically insular and insulating. Empiricism itself is then simply another system among systems. Adopting an outsider's perspective is needed; yet the authors cited shun the other and his views, rejecting them and refusing to consider or incorporate their "alien" ideas and perspectives. The necessity of an outsider's perspective is a Bakhtinian notion also, one Todorov (1984, p. 99) renders with the Greek term *exotopy*, "literally 'finding oneself outside.'" Others describe the growth that results from being able to set oneself outside the limits, reference systems, or organizations one is part of. We shall consider one such developmental framework—that described by Robert Kegan (1994).

Kegan's Five Orders of Consciousness

As with other developmentalists (e.g., Piaget, Maslow), Kegan (1994) posits that there are stages of development through which adults may pass. Kegan enumerates five such stages, or orders of consciousness (see Figure 1.)

For our purposes, the three highest orders of consciousness-the traditional, the modern, and the postmodern—are relevant, for as Kegan postulates, most adults function at level three or higher. Collapsing levels one and two, and levels three and four, other authors (Garmston, Lipton & Kaiser, 1998) have written of Kegan's work as detailing three stages-the interpersonal (Kegan's first and second orders), the institutional (Kegan's third and fourth orders), and the post-institutional (Kegan's fifth order of consciousness). This later typology will serve as an analytical tool for the current discussion, for, as I will show, the texts cited and analyzed in this article reflect thinking that is characteristics of the institutional level of Garmston et al.'s framework and at orders three and four of Kegan's. People at "higher" orders of consciousness continue to hold the logics, the consciousness, of previous, "lower" levels as subsystems of their current consciousness.

Of those at the institutional level, Garmston et al. claim that,

A limitation for these persons, however, can be that they get locked into perpetuating their own systems as a goal and miss the opportunity to engage in critical reflection and modification of their own systems. These persons can be closed to information or ideologies that challenge their systems of meaning. . . . (p. 264)

Figure 1.

	Subject	Object	Underlying Stucture
1	PERCEPTIONS *Fantasy* SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS Impulses	Movement Sensation	Single point/ Immediate/ Atomistic •
2	CONCRETE *Actuality* Data, Cause-and-effect POINT OF VIEW Role-Concept Simple Reciprocity (tit-for-tat) ENDURING DISPOSITIONS Needs, Preferences Self Concept	Perceptions Social Perceptions Impulses	Durable Category
3 TRADITIONALISM	ABSTRACTIONS *Ideality* *Inference, Generalization* *Hypothesis, Proposition* *Ideals, Values* MUTUALITY/INTERPERSONALISM Role Consiousness Mutual Reciprocity INNER STATES Subjectivity, Self-Consciousness	Concrete Point of View Enduring Dispositions Needs, Preferences	Cross-Categorical Trans-Categorical
4 MODERNISM	ABSTRACT SYSTEMS *Ideology* Formulation, Authorization Relations between Abstractions INSTITUTION Relationship-Regulating Forms Multiple-Role Consciousness SELF-AUTHORSHIP Self-Regulation, Self-Formation Identity, Automomy, Individuation	Abstractions Mutuality Interpersonalism Inner States Subjectivity Self-Consciousness	System/Complex
5 POST-MODERNISM	DIALECTICAL Trans-ideological/Post-Ideological Testing Formulation, Paradox Contradiction, Oppositeness INTER-INSTITUTIONAL Relationship between Forms Interpenetration of Self and Other SELF-TRANSFORMATION Interpenetration of Selves Inter-Individuation	Abstract System Ideology Institution Relationship- Regulating Forms Self-Authorship Self-Regulation Self-Formation	Trans-System Trans-Complex

LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

K	COGNITIVE
E	INTERPERSONAL
Y	INTRAPERSONAL

These appear to be the conditions and beliefs affecting Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy. In Kegan's framework, these authors and those they represent are locked within their own systems. Though those at this level can perceive complexity, they are unable to view their system as one of a multiplicity of systems and cannot engage in trans-systems thinking (See Figure 1.). Moreover, they have difficulty setting themselves outside their system.

In contrast, those in the post-institutional (or post-modern in Kegan's terms) orders of consciousness can set themselves apart from the systems they are part of and recognize and deal with multiple systems. For someone at this level "no ideology is considered ultimate" and he/she "has a great respect for individual differences, is open to questions, possibilities, conflict and reconstruction, and value[s] ambiguity" (Garmston et al., p. 264).

Lest I be misunderstood, I need to be clear that ideology or the politics one holds is not indicative of the order of consciousness one has obtained. That is to say that holding radical political or epistemological positions is no guarantee or indication of obtaining a higher order of consciousness. Leftists, for example, can and do operate at the third or fourth order of consciousness; just as there are those with more conservative politics who might operate at higher orders of consciousness. There are many paths to wisdom. Kegan (1994) underscores this point in his discussion of socialization, using the example of constructivist college professors/instructors and their efforts to drag undergraduates (most barely attaining the third order of consciousness) to the instructor's level: "The third order of mind is both capable of, and subject to socialization. It is not able to reflect critically on that into which it is being socialized. It is responsive to socialization, not responsible for it" (p. 288). Critical of the naiveté of such social constructivists, Kegan writes that,

> Education as socialization into a discourse community may be fitting to the student's third order capacities, but it may also leave the student with no greater capacity to resist induction in the future into communities of discourse less benign. . . It may amount to an education for inauthenticity, since one learns the right moves and the right words but accomplishes no 'inside out' mastery of the locality's discipline. . . Socialization into a discourse community might be the fanciest version of substituting training for education and changes in learning for changes in knowing. . . If a given epistemological way of understanding is as robust and long-lived as my own research would suggest, then altering this kind of knowing cannot be as easy as teaching people to speak a foreign language. It inevitably involves separations from the self. (pp. 289-290)

Growth, for Kegan, is prompted through the twin processes of support and challenge.

Summary/Conclusion

I believe I have demonstrated how some scholars in educational administration have drawn the lines in the paradigm wars. I have also demonstrated, through discourse analysis, some of the characteristics of the sides in such a war and some aspects of thinking of those who might place themselves on either side. The writings of Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy that were used as textual samples in this article show evidence that those writers (scholars?) represent cultures or subcultures, subcultures in American intellectual thought. I doubt whether the authors themselves would perceive their way of thinking as one of many equally viable systems of thought, as a particular culture or subculture; but that is the nature of consciousness of the third and fourth orders. This particular thought system was shown to be insular.

Kegan's (1994) orders of consciousness framework was employed to highlight some of the characteristics of a cultural system or subsystem represented by Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English,

and Murphy. Also, though not fully developed, I mentioned how support and challenge were the twin processes that foster human development.

Some Thoughts, Caveats, and Reservations

Some of the ideologies or ideas that comprise my own system of beliefs, my assumptions, include the following:

1. During hostilities (paradigm wars, divorce, etc.), the participants aren't the only ones who are likely to be affected. Others can become involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, and, sometimes, can suffer collateral damage;
2. A more complex perspective permits us to allow that positions aren't monolithic;
3. People hold positions, not the reverse;
4. Likewise, people can hold multiple, seemingly conflicting positions;
5. It is people who cross the borders artificially separating "sides";
6. Education should be, above all else, concerned with human growth and development (ours and others), not with scoring points, counting coup or winning; and
7. The growth of individuals-our students and ourselves-will end the paradigm wars, and this growth is done in relationship with others.

People and social phenomena are more complicated than our simple models or theories allow. People can hold complex, seemingly contradictory positions and it is people who mediate those positions, much as children of divorce must mediate the messages they get from their parents. People hold theories or positions, not the reverse. It is through the development of individual people, our students and ourselves, that growth comes. We must comport ourselves appropriately.

As to the issue or question of socialization into a discourse community, into the norms of practice, the ramifications are clear, even if the solutions aren't. At what point does socialization into a discourse community become dysfunctional, inhibiting further growth for students of educational administration and their teachers?

Notes

1. This article is based upon a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Seattle, Washington (USA), April 11, 2001. I wish to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers of International Studies in Educational Administration for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.

2. Discourse is used in this article to refer to the communication of meaning (consciously or unconsciously, implied or inferred), usually, though not always, through the word. Discourse implies a relationship between the word and its meaning, just as it implies other relationships, such as those between the people involved. The meaning of a word is socio-historical (Bakhtin, 1981) and caught in a web of power and other relationships.
   Language or discourse is situated along an action-non-action continuum that can be said to run from the absence of any kind of action; through thought, discourse (speech, writing, etc.) and physical action accompanied by discourse; to bald physical action alone, unaccompanied by discourse. For some (e.g., Ricouer, 1971), action and text, for example, are similar, in that the "text" of an action can be interpreted using textual analysis (i.e., hermeneutics).

3. Jejune: "je·june (ji j__n´) adj. [[L jejunus, empty, dry, barren]] 1 not nourishing; barren 2 not interesting or satisfying; dull or empty 3 [by confusion with JUVENILE] not mature, childish" (Webster's New World(Dictionary, Third College Edition, New York: New World, 1988, p. 724).

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"The Paradigm Wars" in Educational Administration: an Attempt at Transcendence

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Abstract: *This article addresses the "paradigm wars" (Gage, 1989; Anderson & Herr, 1999) as they are manifested in educational administration through consideration of text and discourse in that field.[1] The paradigm wars in educational administration represent a deep-seated division in the field between, for example, those who might be termed positivists and those who might be termed post-positivists - although each of these terms is contested. The division however is more deep-seated and the differences are said to be epistemological (Willower & Forsyth, 1999).*
The author shows that what differences exist are not just epistemological, but ontological as well. In fact, examining educational administration text samples from a linguistic, anthropological perspective (Duranti, 1997), it is suggested that the differences exhibited are cultural. Based on this line of argument, can these differences be overcome and, if so, how might that happen?
This article begins with a brief discussion of the paradigm wars, including its genesis. Examples from the scholarship in educational administration are discussed and analysed, employing a relatively simple discourse analysis and an anthropological or ethnographic lens. Finally, Kegan's (1994) levels of consciousness framework is applied to the paradigm wars in an effort to transcend them. Implications for educational administrator preparation are discussed.

The Paradigm Wars in Educational Administration: a Brief History

Deep and heartfelt differences threatened to rend the educational research community of scholars in the early to mid- Eighties. The differences at that time were seen as a debate among researchers holding to different epistemologies, especially between those who advocated qualitative research and those who advocated quantitative research (Smith, 1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986). This disagreement was variously referred to as a debate (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; Eisner & Peshkin, 1990) and a dialog (Guba, 1990) between paradigms. Gage (1989) points to changing views on teaching and research on teaching as a milestone in what he termed "the Paradigm Wars". This was the first time, to my knowledge, that this phrase was used. Employing the terminology of its critics, Gage referred to the then mainstream view as "'positivistic social science'" (p. 4). The alternative views Gage identified as "the anti-naturalist," "the interpretivist" and "the critical theorist critiques".

The paradigm wars affected educational administration, with critics such as Thomas Greenfield squared off against more mainstream scholars such as Donald Willower (Gail Furman-

its methods"-which were, to them, "essentially derivative"; "such attacks were abetted by the resurgence of subjectivist and neo-Marxist thought and the spread of postmodernist and poststructural views"; "these perspectives tended to stress advocacy and political agendas and either downplayed or rejected scientific inquiry"; and the non-conventional writing "from such sources tended to be prose arguments rather than empirical research".

Here, we have a case of simple binary opposition: good versus bad. Attacks on science and its methods cannot be good, especially when abetted (defined by Webster's New World(Dictionary [1994, p. 2] as "to incite, sanction, or help, esp. in wrongdoing") by subjectivism and neo-Marxist thought-which, by this time had come to be repudiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union proved this social experiment to have been misguided, especially in the minds of social conservatives. To describe the increasing influence of "postmodernist" and "poststructuralist" views (these not even given the credibility or status of philosophies or schools of thought, but views) as a "spread" likens their increasing influence to the infestation characteristic of a disease. That these "perspectives" (again, not philosophies in their own right) stressed advocacy and political agendas, to the conservative, dare I say, positivist mind, is unpardonable, given the positivist's preference for objectivism (over, say, subjectivism) and value-neutral science. The coup de grace, to these authors' way of thinking, is delivered in the final sentence of the passage quoted, where the authors dismiss these attacks, views, and perspectives as being "prose arguments" (not given the legitimacy of logic or even rhetoric) "rather than empirical research." Again, we see the binary opposition: views and perspectives versus science and empirical research; hardly, in these authors' eyes, could the work they demonize be considered research, or even scholarship (that is, because it is prose). And the fact that these attacks are seen as derivative means that they are not even original. In an extremely critical discussion of those "whose predilections are antiscience" (Willower & Forsyth, 1999, p. 4), the authors attempt to undermine others' arguments by claiming that, even though they are anti-science, they still use the methods of science, that being logical argument: "those who oppose science are caught in the logic of argument." "Logical argument," the authors maintain, "is also at the heart of scientific interpretation and explanation." They aver that "logic provides a critical criterion" of the efficacy of science and scientific interpretation. "In the realm of empirical research, if one casts aside the norms and standards of science," they continue,

> the work appears flawed to other researchers. It is attention to these norms and standards . . . that confers legitimacy in matters of inquiry. A commitment to logic and evidence remains the touchstone of quality in educational administration, despite debates about philosophy and science. (ibid.)

Though these authors repeatedly invoke evidence and logic as essential criteria in science, especially empirical research, they fail to define the terms or elaborate on them. They enumerate no essential characteristics of either logic or evidence. These norms and standards remain unexamined.

Wayne Hoy, a student of Willower's, wrote a eulogy on the occasion of Willower's death, published in the newsletter of The University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), The UCEA Review. In it, Hoy (2001, p. 2) wrote of Willower, that he saw writing and publication as ends in themselves and that writing and publication "were embodied in his view of science as self-critical and self-correcting". Hoy did elaborate a bit on what he perceived the norms of science to be: "The norms of science include skeptical, open-mindedness, impersonal criteria of assessment, and publication of results." Citing Willower, Hoy stated that:

Responding to English's criticism, Murphy (2000) stated that the authors of the Standards sought out criticism and critique of them, but that

> *[on] the other hand, it would probably be helpful if these analyses were based on the design of the Standards or on the Standards themselves. However, none of the strategies that English employs-imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism-meets this criterion.¹ (p. 411)*

In his conclusion, Murphy reiterates that the Standards "should be subject to analysis and critique," and that the critique "should be connected to the Standards and the intellectual infrastructure on which they are built" (p. 414). He ends his rejoinder by stating that, "Because English fails to address this basic criterion, his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" (p. 414).

The reader of these texts is left with the sense that these two authors are speaking past each other-each steadfastly holding onto his (in this case) beliefs. This is based on the passion with which each writes, as evidenced by the 'loaded' language used (i.e., "belief statements based on metaphysical tenets as opposed to empirical positions" and "an example of a pseudo scientific agenda shaped into . . . scientific ideology" in English's case; and "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" and "his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" in Murphy's case). It is doubtful that either author will alter his beliefs based on the arguments of the other.

If a change of mind is unlikely (though this is an interpretation of mine and not explicitly supported by the texts in question), what is the intent of the authors? In all likelihood, the intent of the authors in the above case could be at least two-fold: to "score points" in an argument and, thereby, 1) gain adherents to one's position, and/or 2) influence educational policy through influencing policymakers. These possibilities introduce the performative function/aspect of language and call attention to the potential audience for such texts. Also if, in Hegelian dialectical terms (thesis plus antithesis equals synthesis), each position presents the other's antithesis, and if, as I've suggested above, the authors are unlikely to alter their positions based on the exchange of ideas presented, then from where is the synthesis likely to come? The most likely candidate to provide a synthesis is a third party, a disinterested third party probably.

A third party did enter this particular debate (Anderson, 2001), though his level of disinterestedness is open to question; his article being a critical discourse analysis of the ISLLC Standards. This author undertook a thorough deconstruction of both the Standards and the examinations that are coming on line to assess educational administration students' supposed understanding and application of them. While the Standards were the main focus of the article, the author did manage to ally himself with English's position and attempted to undermine Murphy's. In an aside centered on the remark of Murphy's cited above (i.e., where Murphy criticized English's "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" [Murphy, 2000, p. 411]), Anderson chides Murphy for "taking pointed-headed academics to task" (p. 200). In a footnote to his "pointed-headed academics" phrase, Anderson notes:

> *This ploy to marginalise "academics", particularly those who engage in critical theory, is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which being that it would disqualify Murphy himself. Epistemologically it is flawed because being immersed in practice can be either an advantage or a disadvantage as both insider and outsider perspectives are needed. It also sets up a*

The elements in a culture thought to be common sense,

> *are conflated into comprising one large realm of the given and undeniable, a catalog of in-the-grain-of-nature realities so peremptory as to force themselves upon any mind sufficiently unclouded to receive them. Yet this is clearly not so. . . . Religion rests its case on revelation, science on method, ideology on moral passion; but common sense rests its on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a nutshell. The world is its authority. (Geertz, 1983, p. 75)*

So it is that common sense, for Geertz, is a cultural system. There are, perhaps, common sense aspects to all cultural systems. If this is true, and if the "sides" in the so-called paradigm wars represent different systems of belief, different ontologies, different cultures, then we can safely assume that the position(s) Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy criticize (sometimes referred to as "subjectivist," "critical theory," "anti-science," and so on) has its own set of common sense beliefs. In seeking to understand those common sense beliefs, the researcher must detail those aspects of each system that "might be called its stylistic features, the marks of attitude that give it its peculiar stamp" (Geertz, 1983, p. 85); for only in doing so, can the common sense systems "be transculturally characterized."

An emic or experience-near system is self-referential. That is, being derived from the linguistic term "phonemic" (Pike, 1965), an emic system can be seen as a whole, whose parts are related only to other parts within the system. For the present analysis, such systems may also be termed language or discourse communities. An etic system of analysis, on the other hand, is representative of the total universe of possible occurrences. Such a system of analysis is what Geertz and others (e.g., Agar, 1980) refer to as experience distant (see, also, Anderson & Herr, 1999).

The relation between culture and language is complex, though language is believed to represent the consciousness of the user (Garmston, Kaiser & Lipton, 1998). The linguistic anthropological analysis above is bolstered by consideration of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Agar, 1994). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis-a synthesis of the thought of linguistic anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf-holds there to be a relation between the language a people speaks and their culture. The strong version of the hypothesis holds that culture determines language; the weak version of the hypothesis simply holds there to be a correlation. If this part of my thesis holds-that is, that the differing sides in the paradigm wars may represent different, distinct cultures-this has ramifications for the question of incommensurability (Donmoyer, 1999) between the sides.

Simplistic Thinking and Models

Cross-cultural (mis)understanding
Conceiving of the differing sides of the so-called paradigm wars as differing cultures allows us recourse to the extensive literature of cross- or inter-cultural communication (e.g., Scollon & Scollon, 1995) as a possible vehicle for analysis. Two cultural phenomena relevant to the present discussion are those of socialization and labeling or stereotyping (Scollon & Scollon, 1995). Scollon and Scollon note how negative stereotyping creates problems in intercultural communication in that it permits the characteristics of different groups to be framed as polar opposites (p. 160). This us/them dichotomization inhibits communication and understanding. The binary oppositions employed by the authors cited earlier are examples of such dichotomization and their use contributes to severe negative consequences. Binary oppositions,

Language Games

Another analytical lens through which we could view the so-called paradigm wars and the volleys, the texts, such wars produce is that of language games (Wittgenstein, 1953). Wittgenstein claimed that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (p. 8e) and that, "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, [is] the 'language-game'" (1953, p. 5e). Wittgenstein fostered thinking of language in more complex ways than had heretofore been the case. He gestured toward a more complex, socio-historical conceptualization of language:

> Just as a move in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and so on. (p. 17e)

A socio-historical analysis of language, of discourse and text, such as that intimated by Wigggenstein is similar to a Bakhtinian perspective. Bakhtin (1981) held that words came to us already always encrusted with meaning and that such words and their meaning were ideological (Volosinov, 1973/1986). Not only that, but such words (this includes texts) are spoken into such already politically-loaded situations, and done so in such a way that the speaker recognizes and even anticipates the hearer's (or reader's) perception of the word, his/her perceptual horizon. The texts we have been examining fall prey to such influences as well. As such, these texts, rather than being simply-that-which-they-seem, are multifaceted, complex, even (self-)contradictory.

Consideration of the paradigm wars as a type of language game prompts us to enquire as to what kinds of moves the texts by Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy represent. First, as the relatively simple content analysis above attempted to demonstrate, on the superficial level, the simply-that-which-they-seem level, the texts in question represent an identification, a call to allegiance: This (our side) is good; it is science and we are scholars. The simply-that-which-it-seems level of the Hoy (2001) eulogy is that of a tribute, though it too demonstrates a taking-of-sides and a vilification of the other, and by aligning himself with Willower, Hoy seeks to be included among the scholars, the scientists. In lauding Willower, Hoy touted Willower's beliefs that a "scientific approach provided a guide to thoughtful action, indeed, he argued that it was 'startlingly superior to such alternatives as authority, faith, intuition or tradition'. . . . (Willower, 1994, p. 470)" (Hoy, 2001, p. 2). Hoy applauded Willower and his science; its processes, which are believed to be self-critical and self-correcting; and its norms, skeptical, open-minded, and impersonal. And though Willower and Forsyth (1999) claim that pursuit of such scientific processes has resulted in "generating knowledge and resolving problems" (p. 11), they show no willingness to accept that such goals may be circular, insular, and self-referential (an emic system, see discussion above). As English (2001b) has demonstrated, there has been no paradigm shift in educational administration, only a recentering and a shifting of the margins within the same paradigm. Similarly, Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English (2000), and Murphy employ circular, self-referential reasoning. The knowledge generation and problem resolution Willower and Forsyth trumpet may not be as remarkable as they claim if there are only incremental shifts in the frame within à singular paradigm. Schön (1989) lends credence to this analysis when he commented that:

> *Complexity and uncertainty are not dissolved through application of specialized knowledge to well-defined tasks; on the contrary, tasks become well-defined through the restructuring of complex and uncertain solutions. The irreducible element of art in practice cannot be reduced to the exercise of*

Figure 1.

	Subject	Object	Underlying Stucture	
1	PERCEPTIONS *Fantasy* SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS Impulses	Movement Sensation	Single point/ Immediate/ Atomistic •	**LINES OF DEVELOPMENT** K COGNITIVE E INTERPERSONAL Y INTRAPERSONAL
2	CONCRETE *Actuality* Data, Cause-and-effect POINT OF VIEW Role-Concept Simple Reciprocity (tit-for-tat) ENDURING DISPOSITIONS Needs, Preferences Self Concept	Perceptions Social Perceptions Impulses	Durable Category	
3 **TRADITIONALISM**	ABSTRACTIONS *Ideality* *Inference, Generalization* *Hypothesis, Proposition* *Ideals, Values* MUTUALITY/INTERPERSONALISM Role Consiousness Mutual Reciprocity INNER STATES Subjectivity, Self-Consciousness	Concrete Point of View Enduring Dispositions Needs, Preferences	Cross-Categorical Trans-Categorical	
4 **MODERNISM**	ABSTRACT SYSTEMS *Ideology* Formulation, Authorization Relations between Abstractions INSTITUTION Relationship-Regulating Forms Multiple-Role Consciousness SELF-AUTHORSHIP Self-Regulation, Self-Formation Identity, Automomy, Individuation	Abstractions Mutuality Interpersonalism Inner States Subjectivity Self-Consciousness	System/Complex	
5 **POST-MODERNISM**	DIALECTICAL Trans-ideological/Post-Ideological Testing Formulation, Paradox Contradiction, Oppositeness INTER-INSTITUTIONAL Relationship between Forms Interpenetration of Self and Other SELF-TRANSFORMATION Interpenetration of Selves Inter-Individuation	Abstract System Ideology Institution Relationship- Regulating Forms Self-Authorship Self-Regulation Self-Formation	Trans-System Trans-Complex	

and Murphy. Also, though not fully developed, I mentioned how support and challenge were the twin processes that foster human development.

Some Thoughts, Caveats, and Reservations

Some of the ideologies or ideas that comprise my own system of beliefs, my assumptions, include the following:

1. During hostilities (paradigm wars, divorce, etc.), the participants aren't the only ones who are likely to be affected. Others can become involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, and, sometimes, can suffer collateral damage;
2. A more complex perspective permits us to allow that positions aren't monolithic;
3. People hold positions, not the reverse;
4. Likewise, people can hold multiple, seemingly conflicting positions;
5. It is people who cross the borders artificially separating "sides";
6. Education should be, above all else, concerned with human growth and development (ours and others), not with scoring points, counting coup or winning; and
7. The growth of individuals-our students and ourselves-will end the paradigm wars, and this growth is done in relationship with others.

People and social phenomena are more complicated than our simple models or theories allow. People can hold complex, seemingly contradictory positions and it is people who mediate those positions, much as children of divorce must mediate the messages they get from their parents. People hold theories or positions, not the reverse. It is through the development of individual people, our students and ourselves, that growth comes. We must comport ourselves appropriately.

As to the issue or question of socialization into a discourse community, into the norms of practice, the ramifications are clear, even if the solutions aren't. At what point does socialization into a discourse community become dysfunctional, inhibiting further growth for students of educational administration and their teachers?

Notes

1. This article is based upon a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Seattle, Washington (USA), April 11, 2001. I wish to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers of International Studies in Educational Administration for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.

2. Discourse is used in this article to refer to the communication of meaning (consciously or unconsciously, implied or inferred), usually, though not always, through the word. Discourse implies a relationship between the word and its meaning, just as it implies other relationships, such as those between the people involved. The meaning of a word is socio-historical (Bakhtin, 1981) and caught in a web of power and other relationships.
   Language or discourse is situated along an action-non-action continuum that can be said to run from the absence of any kind of action; through thought, discourse (speech, writing, etc.) and physical action accompanied by discourse; to bald physical action alone, unaccompanied by discourse. For some (e.g., Ricouer, 1971), action and text, for example, are similar, in that the "text" of an action can be interpreted using textual analysis (i.e., hermeneutics).

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"The Paradigm Wars" in Educational Administration: an Attempt at Transcendence

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Abstract: *This article addresses the "paradigm wars" (Gage, 1989; Anderson & Herr, 1999) as they are manifested in educational administration through consideration of text and discourse in that field.[1] The paradigm wars in educational administration represent a deep-seated division in the field between, for example, those who might be termed positivists and those who might be termed post-positivists - although each of these terms is contested. The division however is more deep-seated and the differences are said to be epistemological (Willower & Forsyth, 1999).*

The author shows that what differences exist are not just epistemological, but ontological as well. In fact, examining educational administration text samples from a linguistic, anthropological perspective (Duranti, 1997), it is suggested that the differences exhibited are cultural. Based on this line of argument, can these differences be overcome and, if so, how might that happen?

This article begins with a brief discussion of the paradigm wars, including its genesis. Examples from the scholarship in educational administration are discussed and analysed, employing a relatively simple discourse analysis and an anthropological or ethnographic lens. Finally, Kegan's (1994) levels of consciousness framework is applied to the paradigm wars in an effort to transcend them. Implications for educational administrator preparation are discussed.

The Paradigm Wars in Educational Administration: a Brief History

Deep and heartfelt differences threatened to rend the educational research community of scholars in the early to mid- Eighties. The differences at that time were seen as a debate among researchers holding to different epistemologies, especially between those who advocated qualitative research and those who advocated quantitative research (Smith, 1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986). This disagreement was variously referred to as a debate (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; Eisner & Peshkin, 1990) and a dialog (Guba, 1990) between paradigms. Gage (1989) points to changing views on teaching and research on teaching as a milestone in what he termed "the Paradigm Wars". This was the first time, to my knowledge, that this phrase was used. Employing the terminology of its critics, Gage referred to the then mainstream view as "'positivistic social science'" (p. 4). The alternative views Gage identified as "the anti-naturalist," "the interpretivist" and "the critical theorist critiques".

The paradigm wars affected educational administration, with critics such as Thomas Greenfield squared off against more mainstream scholars such as Donald Willower (Gail Furman-

Brown, personal communication, April 11, 2001). In an analysis of organizational culture, Angus (1996) described one perspective in this paradigm war as the mainstream (which itself had both functionalist and interpretivist "camps"). This perspective, according to Angus, was firmly entrenched in the human relations tradition. In criticizing the mainstream, Angus wrote, "both mainstream conceptions of organizational culture (which have been enthusiastically and uncritically appropriated into educational administration) reduce the complexity of culture to an almost absurd level of simplicity by emphasizing only that culture creates consensus" (p. 976). According to Angus, the human relations approach draws upon a rational model of organizations. This rational model and its adherents emphasized "technical, managerial management" and "embraced a fairly simplistic form of positivism" (p. 979). The features of the conventional approach were, for Angus, "the rational model, positivist methodology, and the dominance of administrative-technical concerns" (p. 980).

An opposing perspective for Angus (1996) is the critical approach to educational administration, begun with Greenfield's critiques of the conventional perspective (p. 978). Greenfield's contribution, according to Angus, was to posit that, rather than focusing on "management, techniques of management control, or universal laws of administration" (p. 979), the focus ought to be on "ordinary participants and their day-to-day social interaction" (ibid.). The critical perspective introduces issues of power, agency, and social justice into analyzing organizational cultures and educational administration. Basically, for Angus' analysis, there are two sides in the paradigm wars: the mainstream (including the "functionalists" or "technicists" and the mainstream interpretivists, both coming from a human relations perspective) versus those of a critical persuasion.

The broadsides and volleys of the early skirmishes in the paradigm wars in educational administration still echo in its scholarship today (and will be the subject of at least part of the analysis to follow) (see, for example, English, 2000, 2001a; Hoy, 2001; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000; Waite, 2001).

Analysis

Discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1989; Gee, 1999) has proven effective in analyzing language in educational administration, whether that language was spoken (Corson, 1995, 2000; Wodak, 1995) or written (Anderson, 2001). With something as complex as language, especially language in use, analysis can employ one or a combination of several different approaches and be of varying depth levels. The first level of analysis of the text may be a relatively simple content analysis, or a word count. A second-level analysis is an examination of the words used for their surface-level meaning(s).[2]

First example

Handbooks of research, generally, are presumed to be authoritative texts, representing the authoritative voices in a particular field. The Handbook of Research on Educational Administration (Murphy & Louis, 1999) is no exception. The first chapter in the second edition of the book is a brief history of scholarship on educational administration (Willower & Forsyth, 1999).

In the text by Willower and Forsyth (1999, p. 4) cited above, the use of inflammatory and otherwise stilted language reveals the authors' perspectives and passions. To describe what are to them non-conventional perspectives in/of educational administration, under the subheading of "Reliance on Logic and Evidence," these authors employ phrases such as: "attacks on science and

its methods"-which were, to them, "essentially derivative"; "such attacks were abetted by the resurgence of subjectivist and neo-Marxist thought and the spread of postmodernist and poststructural views"; "these perspectives tended to stress advocacy and political agendas and either downplayed or rejected scientific inquiry"; and the non-conventional writing "from such sources tended to be prose arguments rather than empirical research".

Here, we have a case of simple binary opposition: good versus bad. Attacks on science and its methods cannot be good, especially when abetted (defined by Webster's New World(Dictionary [1994, p. 2] as "to incite, sanction, or help, esp. in wrongdoing") by subjectivism and neo-Marxist thought-which, by this time had come to be repudiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union proved this social experiment to have been misguided, especially in the minds of social conservatives. To describe the increasing influence of "postmodernist" and "poststructuralist" views (these not even given the credibility or status of philosophies or schools of thought, but views) as a "spread" likens their increasing influence to the infestation characteristic of a disease. That these "perspectives" (again, not philosophies in their own right) stressed advocacy and political agendas, to the conservative, dare I say, positivist mind, is unpardonable, given the positivist's preference for objectivism (over, say, subjectivism) and value-neutral science. The coup de grace, to these authors' way of thinking, is delivered in the final sentence of the passage quoted, where the authors dismiss these attacks, views, and perspectives as being "prose arguments" (not given the legitimacy of logic or even rhetoric) "rather than empirical research." Again, we see the binary opposition: views and perspectives versus science and empirical research; hardly, in these authors' eyes, could the work they demonize be considered research, or even scholarship (that is, because it is prose). And the fact that these attacks are seen as derivative means that they are not even original. In an extremely critical discussion of those "whose predilections are antiscience" (Willower & Forsyth, 1999, p. 4), the authors attempt to undermine others' arguments by claiming that, even though they are anti-science, they still use the methods of science, that being logical argument: "those who oppose science are caught in the logic of argument." "Logical argument," the authors maintain, "is also at the heart of scientific interpretation and explanation." They aver that "logic provides a critical criterion" of the efficacy of science and scientific interpretation. "In the realm of empirical research, if one casts aside the norms and standards of science," they continue,

> the work appears flawed to other researchers. It is attention to these norms and standards . . . that confers legitimacy in matters of inquiry. A commitment to logic and evidence remains the touchstone of quality in educational administration, despite debates about philosophy and science. (ibid.)

Though these authors repeatedly invoke evidence and logic as essential criteria in science, especially empirical research, they fail to define the terms or elaborate on them. They enumerate no essential characteristics of either logic or evidence. These norms and standards remain unexamined.

Wayne Hoy, a student of Willower's, wrote a eulogy on the occasion of Willower's death, published in the newsletter of The University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), The UCEA Review. In it, Hoy (2001, p. 2) wrote of Willower, that he saw writing and publication as ends in themselves and that writing and publication "were embodied in his view of science as self-critical and self-correcting". Hoy did elaborate a bit on what he perceived the norms of science to be: "The norms of science include skeptical, open-mindedness, impersonal criteria of assessment, and publication of results." Citing Willower, Hoy stated that:

it is no wonder that he railed against those in educational administration who attacked science as an inappropriate road to knowledge. . . . [He] believed and demonstrated in his own scholarship, writing, and behavior that a scientific approach provided a guide to thoughtful action; indeed, he argued that it was "startlingly superior to such alternatives as authority, faith, intuition or tradition. . . . (Willower, 1994, p. 470)." (ibid.)

Here, as in the preceding passage by Willower and Forsyth (1999), we again see the binary opposition of what these three authors see as "the scientific approach"-which is superior-set against those who attack science and set against authority, faith, intuition and tradition. In each of the texts cited above, words such as "attack," "railed," "anti-science," "abetted," and others may be taken to be inflammatory, lending credence to the interpretation that there is indeed a "paradigm war" underway. At any rate, such language serves as an identifier; identifying sides (or at least one side, for I'm nearly certain that those against whom Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy "rail" would be slow to accept the identifiers attributed to them). Though sections of Willower and Forsyth's chapter speak of unity within the field of educational administration, such as a commitment to logic and evidence being a unifying factor for scholars in educational administration (Willower and Forsyth, 1999, p. 4), such language and the divisions it draws clearly work against any such unification.

Second example

More recently, there has been a debate surrounding the formation and implementation of the Interstate Leadership Licensure Consortium standards in the United States (Anderson, 2001; English, 2000; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000). As with the texts cited above, the textual products of this more recent exchange can be seen as an example of the paradigm wars.

The particular exchange cited here began with a journal article describing the implementation of the Standards (Murphy, Yff & Shipman, 2000). This was followed in short order (English, 2000) by an attack upon the Standards and the assumptions of the authors of the article that described their implementation. In critiquing the authors and the Standards, English writes,

The ISLLC standards must be envisioned as universal and inclusive. If there is anything important to know outside the standards, the claim for exclusivity upon which licensure rests comes up hollow. The authors pose this as a dilemma and beg the question by resorting to privileging "those dimensions that focused on shaping and directing the core technology". (p. 164)

English associates the notion of a core technology with the notion of organizational rationality. He criticized the Standards and the authors' promotion of them as "belief statements based on metaphysical tenets as opposed to empirical positions" (p. 164). Later, English states that "[the] ISLLC standards are an example of a pseudo scientific agenda shaped into . . . scientific ideology" (p. 165), and concludes:

School administrators and professors who prepare them see their work in scientific, neutral, and moral terms, as do the authors of this article [i.e., Murphy, et al.]. They fail to perceive themselves as political players in an ideological struggle for power and domination within the larger social order. (p. 165).

Responding to English's criticism, Murphy (2000) stated that the authors of the Standards sought out criticism and critique of them, but that

> *[on] the other hand, it would probably be helpful if these analyses were based on the design of the Standards or on the Standards themselves. However, none of the strategies that English employs-imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism-meets this criterion.³ (p. 411)*

In his conclusion, Murphy reiterates that the Standards "should be subject to analysis and critique," and that the critique "should be connected to the Standards and the intellectual infrastructure on which they are built" (p. 414). He ends his rejoinder by stating that, "Because English fails to address this basic criterion, his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" (p. 414).

The reader of these texts is left with the sense that these two authors are speaking past each other-each steadfastly holding onto his (in this case) beliefs. This is based on the passion with which each writes, as evidenced by the 'loaded' language used (i.e., "belief statements based on metaphysical tenets as opposed to empirical positions" and "an example of a pseudo scientific agenda shaped into . . . scientific ideology" in English's case; and "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" and "his analysis reveals a good deal about his view of the world but, unfortunately, says little about the ISLLC Standards" in Murphy's case). It is . doubtful that either author will alter his beliefs based on the arguments of the other.

If a change of mind is unlikely (though this is an interpretation of mine and not explicitly supported by the texts in question), what is the intent of the authors? In all likelihood, the intent of the authors in the above case could be at least two-fold: to "score points" in an argument and, thereby, 1) gain adherents to one's position, and/or 2) influence educational policy through influencing policymakers. These possibilities introduce the performative function/aspect of language and call attention to the potential audience for such texts. Also if, in Hegelian dialectical terms (thesis plus antithesis equals synthesis), each position presents the other's antithesis, and if, as I've suggested above, the authors are unlikely to alter their positions based on the exchange of ideas presented, then from where is the synthesis likely to come? The most likely candidate to provide a synthesis is a third party, a disinterested third party probably.

A third party did enter this particular debate (Anderson, 2001), though his level of disinterestedness is open to question; his article being a critical discourse analysis of the ISLLC Standards. This author undertook a thorough deconstruction of both the Standards and the examinations that are coming on line to assess educational administration students' supposed understanding and application of them. While the Standards were the main focus of the article, the author did manage to ally himself with English's position and attempted to undermine Murphy's. In an aside centered on the remark of Murphy's cited above (i.e., where Murphy criticized English's "imaginative reading, academic sophistry, and jejune deconstructionism" [Murphy, 2000, p. 411]), Anderson chides Murphy for "taking pointed-headed academics to task" (p. 200). In a footnote to his "pointed-headed academics" phrase, Anderson notes:

> *This ploy to marginalise "academics", particularly those who engage in critical theory, is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which being that it would disqualify Murphy himself. Epistemologically it is flawed because being immersed in practice can be either an advantage or a disadvantage as both insider and outsider perspectives are needed. It also sets up a*

false dichotomy since most academics in educational administration have themselves been
educational administrators and tend to work closely with administrators. Both are true for both
myself and Fenwick English. (fn. 2, p. 214)

While it is difficult to argue with Anderson's points, it is clear that he allies himself more readily
with English than he does with Murphy, and perhaps in some way attempts to marginalise
Murphy and his views. For though Anderson doesn't recognize it publicly, Murphy, too, has been
an educational administrator "at the school, district, and state levels" (from his biographical note,
Murphy, 2000, p. 411). Anderson is correct that Murphy is an academic and would subject
himself to the criticism he levels at English if the operant word in the phrase "pointed-head
academics" was academics. If not, then the operant term and criticism would be "pointed-
headed", and not "academic." For as Anderson points out about practice-that immersion in it can
be an advantage or a disadvantage—the same could be said of academics. Therefore, it is neither
one's biographical experience nor his/her current position vis-à-vis practice that matters, but the
stance, ideological or otherwise, that one takes to the issue in question. Still, it seems as though
in this debate we are left waiting for yet another third party to provide a synthesis of the polar
positions.

Common sense as a cultural system

That Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy, in the chapter and article cited, neglect to stipulate what they
mean by logic and evidence, especially, suggests that, to them, these concepts fall within the realm
of "what everybody knows." That is, logic and evidence take on the status of being common
sense; this might apply to empiricism more generally.

Logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy; yet, Willower and Forsyth (1999, p. 10) admit that
"scholars [in educational administration] often have limited training in philosophy." These
authors emphatically state that, "Logical argument is also at the heart of scientific interpretation
and explanation" and that "logic provides a critical criterion of the efficacy of science and
scientific interpretation" (p. 4). If logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy, and if, as the authors
state, scholars in educational administration have little or no training in philosophy, where are
these scholars to have gotten training in logic and its application? The authors don't say. We are
left to assume that knowledge of logic and its application are just common sense.

Though Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy would probably be reluctant to accept such an analysis,
their beliefs in logic and evidence, and in other norms and standards to which they ascribe,
constitute a cultural system; if not a cultural system per se, at least a subculture within the culture
of American academic research. And if what English (2000, p. 160) asserts about the formation
of the ISLLC Standards is true (i.e., that they "were established via 'professional consensus'"),
this consensus reflects "common sense" (i.e., norms) and thereby is reflective of a cultural system.
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1983) described common sense as a cultural system.

The cultural systems represented by the beliefs of Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, Murphy, and
English can be seen in terms of what anthropologists refer to as an emic system. Geertz (1983)
uses the term "experience near" similarly. Geertz asserts that,

People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, unself-consciously, as it were colloquially; they
do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any "concepts" involved at all.
That is what experience-near means—that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally and
indissolubly bound up together. (p. 58)

The elements in a culture thought to be common sense,

> *are conflated into comprising one large realm of the given and undeniable, a catalog of in-the-grain-of-nature realities so peremptory as to force themselves upon any mind sufficiently unclouded to receive them. Yet this is clearly not so. . . . Religion rests its case on revelation, science on method, ideology on moral passion; but common sense rests its on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a nutshell. The world is its authority. (Geertz, 1983, p. 75)*

So it is that common sense, for Geertz, is a cultural system. There are, perhaps, common sense aspects to all cultural systems. If this is true, and if the "sides" in the so-called paradigm wars represent different systems of belief, different ontologies, different cultures, then we can safely assume that the position(s) Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy criticize (sometimes referred to as "subjectivist," "critical theory," "anti-science," and so on) has its own set of common sense beliefs. In seeking to understand those common sense beliefs, the researcher must detail those aspects of each system that "might be called its stylistic features, the marks of attitude that give it its peculiar stamp" (Geertz, 1983, p. 85); for only in doing so, can the common sense systems "be transculturally characterized."

An emic or experience-near system is self-referential. That is, being derived from the linguistic term "phonemic" (Pike, 1965), an emic system can be seen as a whole, whose parts are related only to other parts within the system. For the present analysis, such systems may also be termed language or discourse communities. An etic system of analysis, on the other hand, is representative of the total universe of possible occurrences. Such a system of analysis is what Geertz and others (e.g., Agar, 1980) refer to as experience distant (see, also, Anderson & Herr, 1999).

The relation between culture and language is complex, though language is believed to represent the consciousness of the user (Garmston, Kaiser & Lipton, 1998). The linguistic anthropological analysis above is bolstered by consideration of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Agar, 1994). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis-a synthesis of the thought of linguistic anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf-holds there to be a relation between the language a people speaks and their culture. The strong version of the hypothesis holds that culture determines language; the weak version of the hypothesis simply holds there to be a correlation. If this part of my thesis holds-that is, that the differing sides in the paradigm wars may represent different, distinct cultures-this has ramifications for the question of incommensurability (Donmoyer, 1999) between the sides.

Simplistic Thinking and Models

Cross-cultural (mis)understanding

Conceiving of the differing sides of the so-called paradigm wars as differing cultures allows us recourse to the extensive literature of cross- or inter-cultural communication (e.g., Scollon & Scollon, 1995) as a possible vehicle for analysis. Two cultural phenomena relevant to the present discussion are those of socialization and labeling or stereotyping (Scollon & Scollon, 1995). Scollon and Scollon note how negative stereotyping creates problems in intercultural communication in that it permits the characteristics of different groups to be framed as polar opposites (p. 160). This us/them dichotomization inhibits communication and understanding. The binary oppositions employed by the authors cited earlier are examples of such dichotomization and their use contributes to severe negative consequences. Binary oppositions,

us/them stereotyping and labeling result from overly simplistic thinking. Social psychologists treat similar phenomena through application of attribution theory, especially fundamental attribution errors (Ross, 1977; Gardner, 1991). Such errors, essentially errors of stereotyping, result from overly simplistic application of empirical observation and assumptions concerning peoples' behaviors-peoples' behaviors are erroneously assumed to be caused by the peoples' inherent characteristics (e.g., they are "bad" people, or they are anti-science and subjectivist), rather than as a result of more complex situational factors.

Such erroneous, negative, and cognitively simplistic thinking results in members of opposing camps adopting what Geertz (2000, p. 50) refers to as the "if you don't believe in my God you must believe in my Devil" assumption, where people (the members of the opposition) are accused of holding absurd positions, "which no one in any seriousness holds" (p. 50), simply if they don't adhere to the opposing party's position. Claims by Willower and Forsyth (1999), cited above, that those who take an opposing view to them are "anti-science" is such an absurd position. It is hard to imagine anyone being "anti-science." And, other than a gratuitous assault on Thomas Greenfield, the authors provide no evidence of those who may hold such an absurd position. True, scholars may criticize the privileged position so-called positivist epistemologies hold in the academy and the hypocrisy of the objectivist and value-neutral claims of those who extol the virtues of that method; still, one can scarcely imagine anyone who is truly anti-science. Is that possible in this day and age?

Socialization into a discourse community

Another relevant cultural phenomenon for the issue under discussion is that of socialization (or enculturation). Scollon and Scollon (1995) identify two primary means by which individuals are socialized into discourse communities-through the natural processes of birth and growth within a family and community, and through socialization into a discourse community (such as a profession or discipline), usually done freely for utilitarian purposes (p. 136).

That socialization relates to issues surrounding the "paradigm wars" is exemplified in Hoy's (2001) eulogy to Willower in which he discusses his teacher's progeny, among other topics. Hoy writes of the hundreds of students ("his professional sons and daughters, grandsons and granddaughters, and great-grandchildren" [p. 2]) in the "Willower lineage," that, through "[a] conservative interpolation yields an estimate of nearly 100 professors and 300 practitioners who are Willower descendents" (p. 15). Of only the first generation of the "Willower lineage," Hoy states that it forms "the foundation of a lineage that is wide and vast, spanning a half dozen countries and reproducing themselves many times over" (p. 15). Extolling the accomplishments of the descendents of Willower, Hoy states that "[to] say that Don Willower's contribution to educational administration was large is an understatement. He left a remarkable living legacy, one that will continue to grow and enrich the field as the years go by" (p. 15).

As is the case in the stereotyping and the black/white, good/bad dichotomization, and the vilification of the opposing "camp" in Willower and Forsyth's (1999) language above, Hoy's (2001) conceptualization of progeny and influence is overly simplistic and overblown. Intellectual influence is not genetic material, to be passed on *in toto* and received passively. It is not cloning. Socialization is an interactive social process (Varenne & McDermott, 1999). Later, 1 will elaborate on overly simplistic thinking, the lack of complexity of the models we use, and the ramifications of these limitations for us. For now, we must consider that socialization to the norms of a profession and its discourse community-in this case, educational administration-may be another function or aspect of the performative nature of the texts in question.

Language Games

Another analytical lens through which we could view the so-called paradigm wars and the volleys, the texts, such wars produce is that of language games (Wittgenstein, 1953). Wittgenstein claimed that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (p. 8e) and that, "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, [is] the 'language-game'" (1953, p. 5e). Wittgenstein fostered thinking of language in more complex ways than had heretofore been the case. He gestured toward a more complex, socio-historical conceptualization of language:

> Just as a move in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and so on. (p. 17e)

A socio-historical analysis of language, of discourse and text, such as that intimated by Wigggenstein is similar to a Bakhtinian perspective. Bakhtin (1981) held that words came to us already always encrusted with meaning and that such words and their meaning were ideological (Volosinov, 1973/1986). Not only that, but such words (this includes texts) are spoken into such already politically-loaded situations, and done so in such a way that the speaker recognizes and even anticipates the hearer's (or reader's) perception of the word, his/her perceptual horizon. The texts we have been examining fall prey to such influences as well. As such, these texts, rather than being simply-that-which-they-seem, are multifaceted, complex, even (self-)contradictory.

Consideration of the paradigm wars as a type of language game prompts us to enquire as to what kinds of moves the texts by Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy represent. First, as the relatively simple content analysis above attempted to demonstrate, on the superficial level, the simply-that-which-they-seem level, the texts in question represent an identification, a call to allegiance: This (our side) is good; it is science and we are scholars. The simply-that-which-it-seems level of the Hoy (2001) eulogy is that of a tribute, though it too demonstrates a taking-of-sides and a vilification of the other, and by aligning himself with Willower, Hoy seeks to be included among the scholars, the scientists. In lauding Willower, Hoy touted Willower's beliefs that a "scientific approach provided a guide to thoughtful action, indeed, he argued that it was 'startlingly superior to such alternatives as authority, faith, intuition or tradition'. . . . (Willower, 1994, p. 470)" (Hoy, 2001, p. 2). Hoy applauded Willower and his science; its processes, which are believed to be self-critical and self-correcting; and its norms, skeptical, open-minded, and impersonal. And though Willower and Forsyth (1999) claim that pursuit of such scientific processes has resulted in "generating knowledge and resolving problems" (p. 11), they show no willingness to accept that such goals may be circular, insular, and self-referential (an emic system, see discussion above). As English (2001b) has demonstrated, there has been no paradigm shift in educational administration, only a recentering and a shifting of the margins within the same paradigm. Similarly, Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English (2000), and Murphy employ circular, self-referential reasoning. The knowledge generation and problem resolution Willower and Forsyth trumpet may not be as remarkable as they claim if there are only incremental shifts in the frame within a singular paradigm. Schön (1989) lends credence to this analysis when he commented that:

> *Complexity and uncertainty are not dissolved through application of specialized knowledge to well-defined tasks; on the contrary, tasks become well-defined through the restructuring of complex and uncertain solutions. The irreducible element of art in practice cannot be reduced to the exercise of*

known technique. Problem-finding has no place in a body of professional knowledge concerned exclusively with problem-solving. One cannot rely on professional expertise in order to choose among competing paradigms of professional practice. (p. 191)

Commenting on a similar process, Wittgenstein (1953) noted how:

We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic. . . The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. . . The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.— Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off. (p. 45e).

The science of Willower, Forsyth, and Hoy and the empiricism English seems to champion in his critique of Murphy can never be self-correcting or self-critical if they are paradigmatically insular and insulating. Empiricism itself is then simply another system among systems. Adopting an outsider's perspective is needed; yet the authors cited shun the other and his views, rejecting them and refusing to consider or incorporate their "alien" ideas and perspectives. The necessity of an outsider's perspective is a Bakhtinian notion also, one Todorov (1984, p. 99) renders with the Greek term *exotopy*, "literally 'finding oneself outside.'" Others describe the growth that results from being able to set oneself outside the limits, reference systems, or organizations one is part of. We shall consider one such developmental framework—that described by Robert Kegan (1994).

Kegan's Five Orders of Consciousness

As with other developmentalists (e.g., Piaget, Maslow), Kegan (1994) posits that there are stages of development through which adults may pass. Kegan enumerates five such stages, or orders of consciousness (see Figure 1.)

For our purposes, the three highest orders of consciousness-the traditional, the modern, and the postmodern—are relevant, for as Kegan postulates, most adults function at level three or higher. Collapsing levels one and two, and levels three and four, other authors (Garmston, Lipton & Kaiser, 1998) have written of Kegan's work as detailing three stages-the interpersonal (Kegan's first and second orders), the institutional (Kegan's third and fourth orders), and the post-institutional (Kegan's fifth order of consciousness). This later typology will serve as an analytical tool for the current discussion, for, as I will show, the texts cited and analyzed in this article reflect thinking that is characteristics of the institutional level of Garmston et al.'s framework and at orders three and four of Kegan's. People at "higher" orders of consciousness continue to hold the logics, the consciousness, of previous, "lower" levels as subsystems of their current consciousness.

Of those at the institutional level, Garmston et al. claim that,

A limitation for these persons, however, can be that they get locked into perpetuating their own systems as a goal and miss the opportunity to engage in critical reflection and modification of their own systems. These persons can be closed to information or ideologies that challenge their systems of meaning. . . . (p. 264)

Figure 1.

	Subject	Object	Underlying Stucture	
1	PERCEPTIONS *Fantasy* SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS Impulses	Movement Sensation	Single point/ Immediate/ Atomistic •	**LINES OF DEVELOPMENT** K — COGNITIVE E — INTERPERSONAL Y — INTRAPERSONAL
2	CONCRETE *Actuality* Data, Cause-and-effect POINT OF VIEW Role-Concept Simple Reciprocity (tit-for-tat) ENDURING DISPOSITIONS Needs, Preferences Self Concept	Perceptions Social Perceptions Impulses	Durable Category 	
3 TRADITIONALISM	ABSTRACTIONS *Ideality* *Inference, Generalization* *Hypothesis, Proposition* *Ideals, Values* MUTUALITY/INTERPERSONALISM Role Consiousness Mutual Reciprocity INNER STATES Subjectivity, Self-Consciousness	Concrete Point of View Enduring Dispositions Needs, Preferences	Cross-Categorical Trans-Categorical 	
4 MODERNISM	ABSTRACT SYSTEMS *Ideology* Formulation, Authorization Relations between Abstractions INSTITUTION Relationship-Regulating Forms Multiple-Role Consciousness SELF-AUTHORSHIP Self-Regulation, Self-Formation Identity, Automomy, Individuation	Abstractions Mutuality Interpersonalism Inner States Subjectivity Self-Consciousness	System/Complex 	
5 POST-MODERNISM	DIALECTICAL Trans-ideological/Post-Ideological Testing Formulation, Paradox Contradiction, Oppositeness INTER-INSTITUTIONAL Relationship between Forms Interpenetration of Self and Other SELF-TRANSFORMATION Interpenetration of Selves Inter-Individuation	Abstract System Ideology Institution Relationship- Regulating Forms Self-Authorship Self-Regulation Self-Formation	Trans-System Trans-Complex 	

These appear to be the conditions and beliefs affecting Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy. In Kegan's framework, these authors and those they represent are locked within their own systems. Though those at this level can perceive complexity, they are unable to view their system as one of a multiplicity of systems and cannot engage in trans-systems thinking (See Figure 1.). Moreover, they have difficulty setting themselves outside their system.

In contrast, those in the post-institutional (or post-modern in Kegan's terms) orders of consciousness can set themselves apart from the systems they are part of and recognize and deal with multiple systems. For someone at this level "no ideology is considered ultimate" and he/she "has a great respect for individual differences, is open to questions, possibilities, conflict and reconstruction, and value[s] ambiguity" (Garmston et al., p. 264).

Lest I be misunderstood, I need to be clear that ideology or the politics one holds is not indicative of the order of consciousness one has obtained. That is to say that holding radical political or epistemological positions is no guarantee or indication of obtaining a higher order of consciousness. Leftists, for example, can and do operate at the third or fourth order of consciousness; just as there are those with more conservative politics who might operate at higher orders of consciousness. There are many paths to wisdom. Kegan (1994) underscores this point in his discussion of socialization, using the example of constructivist college professors/instructors and their efforts to drag undergraduates (most barely attaining the third order of consciousness) to the instructor's level: "The third order of mind is both capable of, and subject to socialization. It is not able to reflect critically on that into which it is being socialized. It is responsive to socialization, not responsible for it" (p. 288). Critical of the naiveté of such social constructivists, Kegan writes that,

> Education as socialization into a discourse community may be fitting to the student's third order capacities, but it may also leave the student with no greater capacity to resist induction in the future into communities of discourse less benign. . . It may amount to an education for inauthenticity, since one learns the right moves and the right words but accomplishes no 'inside out' mastery of the locality's discipline. . . Socialization into a discourse community might be the fanciest version of substituting training for education and changes in learning for changes in knowing. . . If a given epistemological way of understanding is as robust and long-lived as my own research would suggest, then altering this kind of knowing cannot be as easy as teaching people to speak a foreign language. It inevitably involves separations from the self. (pp. 289-290)

Growth, for Kegan, is prompted through the twin processes of support and challenge.

Summary/Conclusion

I believe I have demonstrated how some scholars in educational administration have drawn the lines in the paradigm wars. I have also demonstrated, through discourse analysis, some of the characteristics of the sides in such a war and some aspects of thinking of those who might place themselves on either side. The writings of Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English, and Murphy that were used as textual samples in this article show evidence that those writers (scholars?) represent cultures or subcultures, subcultures in American intellectual thought. I doubt whether the authors themselves would perceive their way of thinking as one of many equally viable systems of thought, as a particular culture or subculture; but that is the nature of consciousness of the third and fourth orders. This particular thought system was shown to be insular.

Kegan's (1994) orders of consciousness framework was employed to highlight some of the characteristics of a cultural system or subsystem represented by Willower, Forsyth, Hoy, English,

and Murphy. Also, though not fully developed, I mentioned how support and challenge were the twin processes that foster human development.

Some Thoughts, Caveats, and Reservations

Some of the ideologies or ideas that comprise my own system of beliefs, my assumptions, include the following:

1. During hostilities (paradigm wars, divorce, etc.), the participants aren't the only ones who are likely to be affected. Others can become involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, and, sometimes, can suffer collateral damage;
2. A more complex perspective permits us to allow that positions aren't monolithic;
3. People hold positions, not the reverse;
4. Likewise, people can hold multiple, seemingly conflicting positions;
5. It is people who cross the borders artificially separating "sides";
6. Education should be, above all else, concerned with human growth and development (ours and others), not with scoring points, counting coup or winning; and
7. The growth of individuals-our students and ourselves-will end the paradigm wars, and this growth is done in relationship with others.

People and social phenomena are more complicated than our simple models or theories allow. People can hold complex, seemingly contradictory positions and it is people who mediate those positions, much as children of divorce must mediate the messages they get from their parents. People hold theories or positions, not the reverse. It is through the development of individual people, our students and ourselves, that growth comes. We must comport ourselves appropriately.

As to the issue or question of socialization into a discourse community, into the norms of practice, the ramifications are clear, even if the solutions aren't. At what point does socialization into a discourse community become dysfunctional, inhibiting further growth for students of educational administration and their teachers?

Notes

1. This article is based upon a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Seattle, Washington (USA), April 11, 2001. I wish to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers of International Studies in Educational Administration for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.

2. Discourse is used in this article to refer to the communication of meaning (consciously or unconsciously, implied or inferred), usually, though not always, through the word. Discourse implies a relationship between the word and its meaning, just as it implies other relationships, such as those between the people involved. The meaning of a word is socio-historical (Bakhtin, 1981) and caught in a web of power and other relationships.

    Language or discourse is situated along an action-non-action continuum that can be said to run from the absence of any kind of action; through thought, discourse (speech, writing, etc.) and physical action accompanied by discourse; to bald physical action alone, unaccompanied by discourse. For some (e.g., Ricouer, 1971), action and text, for example, are similar, in that the "text" of an action can be interpreted using textual analysis (i.e., hermeneutics).

3. Jejune: "je·june (ji j__n´) adj. [[L jejunus, empty, dry, barren]] 1 not nourishing; barren 2 not interesting or satisfying; dull or empty 3 [by confusion with JUVENILE] not mature, childish" (Webster's New World(Dictionary, Third College Edition, New York: New World, 1988, p. 724).

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